Ignorance Over Innovation: Why Misunderstanding Standard Setting Organizations Will Hinder Technological Progress by Osenga, Kristen
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2018
Ignorance Over Innovation: Why
Misunderstanding Standard Setting Organizations
Will Hinder Technological Progress
Kristen Osenga
University of Richmond, kosenga@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science
and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Ignorance Over Innovation: Why Misunderstanding Standard Setting Organizations Will Hinder Technological
Progress, 56 U. Louisville L. Rev. 159 (2018).
IGNORANCE OVER INNOVATION:
WHY MISUNDERSTANDING STANDARD SETTING
ORGANIZATIONS WILL HINDER TECHNOLOGICAL
PROGRESS
Kristen Jakobsen Osenga*
"[Wlithout standardization there wouldn't be a modem economy."
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 2017, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued
Qualcomm Inc. in federal district court, alleging antitrust violations in the
company's licensing of semiconductor chips used in cell phones and more.2
The suit alleges, in part, that Qualcomm refuses to license its patents that
cover innovations incorporated in technology standards (standard-essential
patents, or SEPs), in contradiction of the company's promise to license this
intellectual property on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND)
terms.' According to the FTC, Qualcomm's behavior reduces competitors'
ability to participate in the market, raises prices paid by consumers for
products incorporating the standardized technology, and at bottom, impedes
innovation.!
While there is plenty to criticize about the FTC's action,' the lawsuit is
evidence of a much larger and more fundamental problem. The FTC's
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law; Senior Scholar, Center for the Protection
of Intellectual Property at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. I appreciate comments
received on early versions of this paper at the 2015 Works in Progress IP, hosted by the George
Washington University Law School and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
The research and writing of this paper was supported by the Center for the Protection of Intellectual
Property at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.
' James Surowiecki, Turn of the Century, WIRED (Jan. 1, 2002, 12:00 PM),
http://www.wired.com/wiredlarchive/10.01/standards.html.
2 FTC Charges Qualcomm with Monopolizing Key Semiconductor Device Used in Cell Phones, FED.
TRADE COMM'N (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-charges-
qualcomm-monopolizing-key-semiconductor-device-used.
3 See id.; see also Melissa Lipman, FTC Sues Qualcomm Over Standard-Essential Patent Licenses,
LAw360 (Jan. 17, 2017, 4:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/881729/ftc-sues-qualcomm-over-
standard-essential-patent-licenses [hereinafter Lipman, FTC Sues Qualcommn].
Lipman, FTC Sues Qualcomm, supra note 3.
Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen dissented from the FTC's decision to file suit, noting various
concerns. See Lipman, FTC Sues Qualcomm, supra note 3; Melissa Lipman, 5 Key Takeaways from the
FTC's Qualcomm Patent Suit, LAw360 (Jan. 18, 2017, 9:11 PM),
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allegations are not based on sound economic analysis nor are they supported
by evidentiary findings.6 This is not due to haste or poor practices by the
FTC; it is instead indicative of the FTC's ignorance. Put plainly, the FTC
does not understand technology standards and the organizations that develop
them. And the FTC is not alone in this lack of knowledge. Many courts and
commentators have also demonstrated clear misunderstandings of standard
setting organizations (SSOs). Unfortunately, this is not harmless error or
mere academic diversion. Important legal, business, and policy decisions are
being made based on these misunderstandings. These decisions have the
potential to negatively impact the future of technology standards and,
ultimately, innovation itself.
To understand why decisions that affect standards have a far-reaching
impact on innovation, it is important to grasp the role that these standards
play in today's society. As just one example, consider the remarkable level
of interconnectivity and interoperability we rely on and enjoy. Using a wide
variety of devices and a few simple clicks, we can be instantly connected to
any other person or organization or piece of information, anywhere in the
world, through any number of networks. The innovations and infrastructure
that created today's connected reality did not occur by accident. Rather, the
success of things we take for granted-the Internet, Wi-Fi, 3G and 4G (and
soon 5G) networks, and the myriad devices with which we access these-is
in large part due to technological standards. Particularly in the field of
information and communications technology, although certainly not limited
to this field, standards improve how we do business and enhance everyday
experiences. Standards are prevalent in many and diverse other fields,
including aeronautics, health and life sciences, renewable energy, and
manufacturing.' In fact, standards-facilitated technologies have become so
ubiquitous across all areas that most of us cannot imagine life without them.8
https://www.law360.com/articles/882234/5-key-takeaways-from-the-ftc-s-qualcomm-patent-suit
[hereinafter Lipman, Five Key Takeaways]. Specifically, she points out that the suit was filed on the eve
of a change in administration and it was filed under controversial Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, among other issues. See id.
6 See Lipman, F7C Sues Qualconmm, supra note 3; Lipman, Five Key Takeaways, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Standards Setting Organizations and Standards List, CONSORTrUMINFO.ORG,
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/links (last visited April 22, 2018); NAT'L ACAD. OF SC., PATENT
CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY t (Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill
eds., 2013) [hereinafter NAS PATENT CHALLENGES].
8 It is estimated there are over 50,000 standards developed by more than 600 private sector industry
groups, across a wide range of technologies; it is no wonder that standards are everywhere. See Am. Nat'l
Standards Inst., Overview of the U.S. Standardization System, STANDARDSPORTAL.ORG,
https://standardsportal.org/usaen/standards system.aspx (last visited July 16, 2017).
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Despite our reliance on and enjoyment of these important innovations,
rarely do we talk about technology standards that make them possible. Worse
still, if standards are discussed, it is generally in conjunction with accusations
of negative behaviors by the firms that contribute the technological
innovations that become part of a standard.' For example, owners of patents
incorporated in standards are sometimes accused of using patents to seek
excessively high royalties from companies wanting to manufacture and sell
products implementing the standard.io Others, like Qualcomm, are accused
of unfair dealing when licensing patents covering standardized technology."
Although there is little to no evidence supporting the existence, extent, or
effects of this alleged bad behavior,12 the assertions alone have been
sufficient to compel reaction against firms that participate in standard setting
activities.13 For example, courts have denied injunctive relief to firms who
own patents, found to be infringed, simply because the technology covered
by those patents is part of a standard.14 Commentators and policy makers
have urged both courts and standard setting organizations to adopt policies
that weaken the patent rights of firms that participate in standard setting."
And unfortunately, standard setting organizations are heeding this call. In
2015, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), a major
9 Id.
"o See, e.g., Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, & Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 603-
04 (2007).
" Id. at 605.
12 The purpose of this article is not to refute or confirm the prevalence or effect of bad behavior by
firms or negative effects resulting from standard setting, as excellent research has been done by others in
this area. See, e.g., Damien Geradin, The Meaning of "Fair and Reasonable" in the Context of Third
Party Determinations of FRAND Terms, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 919, 940 (2014) ("[Allthough holdup
and royalty stacking could occur in theory, there is little evidence that they regularly occur in the real
world.") Geradin goes on to explain why they are also theoretically unlikely. See id. at 940-46; see also
Sidak, infra note 73, at 718-19 (discussing studies that question the prevalence of hold-up and royalty
stacking).
13 Geradin, supra note 12, at 941.
" See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Judge Posner,
sitting by designation, stating that he did not believe patents that cover technology standards would be
eligible for injunctive relief). On appeal, the Federal Circuit denied that there exists such a bright line
rule. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("To the extent that the
district court applied aper se rule that injunctions are unavailable for [patents on standardized technology],
it erred."), overruled on other grounds by Williamson v. Citrix, LLC, 972 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see
also infra Section 1II.A. I.
" One of these patent weakening measures would require firms to agree to licensing rates before fully
understanding the value and extent of the technology. See, e.g., Jorge Contreras, Technical Standards and
Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 163, 168 n.17 ("[E]x
ante licensing disclosure [policies] could prevent patent holder from demanding unexpectedly high
royalties ... after a standard has been adopted and locked-in."); see also infra Section III.A.2.
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standard setting organization, became the first to adopt many of these
suggested policies.16
Even accepting at face-value the assertions that some firms participating
in standard setting activities behave badly and that this behavior has negative
impacts, the fact that courts and commentators are trying to fix the problem
without understanding SSOs is akin to renovating a house without checking
for load-bearing walls. Standard setting is a complex, time-intensive,
collaborative process that carries both significant risks and benefits for
participating firms. 17 And yet, the so-called "reforms" being implemented
and proposed drastically reduce the benefits to the innovative firms
contributing foundational technology to standards, seemingly without any
acknowledgement of the accompanying remaining risks and without
analyzing the effects on the standard setting ecosystem as a whole. By failing
to consider the risks while eviscerating the benefits, courts and commentators
are implementing changes to law and policy that will serve to discourage
participation by innovative firms in standard setting activities. Decreased
participation in SSOs may then lead to fewer technologies submitted for
incorporation into standards and, perhaps, less incentives to develop
innovative technologies in the first instance. As fewer firms participate in
standard setting, the quality of the technology incorporated into standards
may wane, leading to suboptimal standards and less adoption of the standards
by the marketplace. This, in turn, destroys a key value of standards-
providing interconnectivity and interoperability. At the end of the day,
disincentivizing participation in standard setting activities will hinder
innovation.
The purpose of this article is to address the knowledge deficit
surrounding SSOs by explaining the basics of standard setting and the firms
that participate in standard setting activities. It will also discuss some of the
common errors about SSOs that have been at the heart of the
misunderstanding, such as the persistent confusion between SSOs and patent
pools. A more accurate understanding of SSOs should allow courts and
commentators to make better decisions about laws and policies surrounding
SSOs, aimed at fixing whatever problems may exist without completely
eroding the incentives to participate in standard setting.
This article will proceed in three parts. Part I will provide an overview
of standard setting organizations, including the range of benefits they provide
" See generally, J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division's Devaluation of Standard Essential
Patents, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 48 (2016). For a more detailed discussion of the IEEE's policy changes
and the effects these changes have had, see infra Section lB.
" Contreras, supra note 15, at 171.
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to firms, competitors, and the public, as well as an in-depth discussion of how
SSOs operate and are governed. Examples of SSOs will be described for
illustration. Because a significant misunderstanding is the confusion and
conflation surrounding SSOs and patent pools, Part If will explain patent
pools in a similar fashion, with a particular emphasis on how patent pools
differ from SSOs in both purpose and operation. Examples of patent pools
will also be described. Finally, Part n will take a deeper look at how judges
have treated SSOs in the patent infringement context, as well as how
commentators have suggested that the behaviors of SSOs or patent owners of
standardized technology be reformed or constrained. Specifically, this part
will illustrate how these judges' and commentators' fundamental
misunderstandings about SSOs are driving their opinions and proposals,
respectively. Finally, this Part will demonstrate how a more accurate
understanding of SSOs would lead to better law and policy for standardized
technology and thus innovation going forward.
II. STANDARD SETTING ORGANIZATIONS
A standard is "any set of technical specifications which either does or is
intended to provide a common design for a product or process" and is related
to characteristics such as quality, safety, or interoperability.s Standards
related to quality or safety serve to inform and/or protect consumers and
ensure that products designed or manufactured in accordance with the
standard meet some minimum specified threshold.1 9 Interoperability and
interconnectivity standards guarantee that standard-compliant products made
by different companies are compatible with other products that also
incorporate the standard, regardless of the manufacturer.20 Occasionally,
these goals overlap, such as when interconnectivity and interoperability
requirements are required to attain a certain level of health and safety.2 1 For
' See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., 2 IP & ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 35-3-35-4 (3d ed. 2017); see also Contreras, supra note 15,
at 164 ("Technical standards are detailed sets of instructions, specifications, or protocols that are used to
achieve a particular technical purpose.").
'1 Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Intellectual Property & Standard Setting, in ABA
HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARDS SETTING 3 (2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstractid=1460997.
21 See id.
21 Health and safety standards, however, do not necessarily specify requirements necessary for
interconnectivity and interoperability. For just one example, there are standards for protecting persons
"from hazards arising from the installation, operation, or maintenance" of overhead and underground
electric lines. See C2-1990 National Electric Safety Code, IEEE STANDARDS ASS'N,
http://standards.icee.org/findstds/standard/C2-1990.html (last visited July 16, 2017).
2018] I63
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example, after the Great Baltimore Fire of 1904,22 the National Fire
Protection Association developed standards for hose and hydrant
connections, hoping to avoid a future disaster where fire brigades from
neighboring locales could not assist in firefighting efforts because their hose
couplings would not fit the hydrants near the incident.23 Next Generation 911
(NG91 1) standards provide a modem example, coordinating emergency
services across a range of jurisdictions and technologies.2 4 It is no
exaggeration to say that we interact with standardized technology multiple
times a day, every single day, to keep us notjust connected, but also safe.
Standards are generally created in one of three ways: government
mandate, market selection, or standard setting organization.25 Although the
government may endorse standards set by the market or SSO, government
mandated standards refer to requirements developed by the government in
the absence of a standard.26 One example of government mandated standards
includes fuel economy requirements for automobiles.27 However,
government mandated standards have become less common as standards
established by the private sector have become more prominent.2 8 Market
selected standards are de facto standards, chosen by the public through an
2 Although the fire led to no direct fatalities, conservative estimates place the damage around $125M
damages in 1904 (estimated $3.30B in 2017-dollar value). See The Great Baltimore Fire, SCI. AM., Feb.
20, 1904, at 154, 154.
' See Robert L. Stoll, What You Should Know About US Standard-Essential Patents, LAW360 (Sept.
25, 2013, 6:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/472229/what-you-should-know-about-us-
standard-essential-patents. Other physical products have been standardized for more than a century to
allow for interoperability, including railroad gauges, drill bits, and electrical plugs. See, e.g., ANDREW L.
RUSSELL, OPEN STANDARDS AND THE DIGITAL AGE: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, AND NETWORKS (2014);
Dieter Ernst, America's Voluntary Standards System-A Best Practice Modelfor Innovation Policy? (E.-
W. Ctr., Working Paper No. 128, 2012), https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publicationslamericas-
voluntary-standards-system-best-practice-model-innovation-policy.
24 See The National 911 Program: Next Generation 911 (NG911) Standards Identification and
Review, 911.Gov I (March 2015), http://www.911.gov/pdflNG911-Standards-Identification-and-
Analysis-March2015.pdf (describing a set of standards coordinating "seamless transmission of data from
the caller to 911, and on to emergency responders" across "multiple local, regional, state, and national
public safety jurisdictions" and across a range of technologies).
25 See Daniel J. Gifford, Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of Standard-Setting Issues
Under the Patent, Copyright, and Antitrust Laws, 43 IDEA 331, 338 (2003).
26 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARv. J. LAW & TECH. 319, 332-333
(2005). Kesan and Shah identify three types of government mandated standards: 1) process standards,
relating to interoperability, 2) product standards, relating to characteristics and information (labeling), and
3) control standards, relating to health, safety, and the environment. See id.
27 See, for example, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards enacted by Congress in
1975 to reduce energy consumption in personal vehicles. See, e.g., Corporate Average Fuel Economy,
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy (last visited July 30,
2017).
28 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1889, 1900 (2002).
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exercise of preference.29 The popularity of one choice creates a positive
feedback loop and eventually, to enhance compatibility and connectivity, the
market leader emerges as a "standard" of sorts. The selection of de facto
standards based on the market remains common; consider for example the
recent choice of Blu-ray over HD DVD.3 0 Because government mandated
standards and market selected standards are not created through agreement
by industry participants, they have not been subject to the same criticisms as
standards created by SSOs.3 1
The remainder of this article, therefore, will focus on standards
developed by SSOs. SSOs are "voluntary collectives in which
representatives from multiple private companies, who are often competitors
of each other, work together to establish technology standards."32 The
standards that result from SSO activities are often referred to as "voluntary
consensus standards."3 3 This section describes the range of benefits that
voluntary consensus standards provide to firms that participate in SSOs,
implementing firms (which may also be SSO participants, but need not be),
and consumers, as well as the criticisms surrounding these standards. Next
this section explains in-depth how SSOs operate with particular attention to
the issues that give rise to the critiques about standardized technology. This
section concludes by illustrating the discussion with a few examples SSOs.
A. Advantages and Disadvantages of Voluntary Consensus Standards
In legal and policy circles, discussions about SSOs and standards are
overwhelmingly focused on potential disadvantages of standardization due
to possible misconduct by participating firms. 34  However, voluntary
consensus standards also create a wide range of advantages for multiple,
29 See Adam Speegle, Note, Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse of the Standard Setting
Process, 110 MICH. L. REv. 847, 848 (2012).
30 See id. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, market selection also created the VHS standard, chosen
over Betamax. See Gifford, supra note 25, at 344 (explaining the network effects that led to VHS
prevailing over Betamax). Despite what may be inferred from these two examples, market selection
standards can and do occur outside of the visual media industry.
" See Gifford, supra note 25, at 333.
32 Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRANDs Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing
Commitments, 89 IND. L. REv. 1, 4 (2009). In addition to private companies, SSO participants may also
include governmental delegates and academic researchers. See Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting
Patents and Access Lock-in: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 364
(2007) ("[SSO participants include] volunteers from interested firms (and sometimes from government
agencies and academic departments) who are technical, not legal or business, experts.").
" See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL
OF RTS. J. 497, 499 (2013).
34 See infra Section I.A.2.
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diverse groups. These include the firms that contribute technology and
knowledge to SSOs (SSO participants), as well as firms that implement and
incorporate standardized technology into their products (implementers) and
consumers that utilize and enjoy the resulting products (consumers). Further,
standards created by SSO participants have recognized positive effects on the
economy" and our lives. 6  Before considering measures that impede
standardization or make participation in standard setting less attractive for
innovative firms, it is important to understand both the advantages and
disadvantages of voluntary consensus standards.
1. Advantages
Multiple advantages arise from standardization. Some of these benefits
arise from the process of standards setting, while others are the result of
having a standard in place. Additionally, parties realize different advantages
depending on their role as SSO participant, implementer, or consumer.
SSO participants are firms that participate in standard setting by
contributing technology, knowledge, or both to the SSO.37 From the
perspective of an SSO participant, both engagement in SSO activities and the
resulting technology standards provide a number of different types of
benefits.38 Active involvement by these firms in the processes by which
standards are selected allows them to influence the direction and outcome of
standard setting.39 If an SSO participant's technology is selected to be
incorporated in the standard, the firm may gain a potential income stream in
the form of revenue from licensing the technology to implementers. In any
case, being involved in the early stages of standards creation will often
35 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33 (2007),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/chapter_2.pdf("Industry standards are widely acknowledged
to be one of the engines driving the modern economy. Standards can make products less costly for firms
to produce and more valuable to consumers. They can increase innovation, efficiency, and consumer
choice; foster public health and safety; and serve as a 'fundamental building block for international
trade."').
36 See, e.g., Renata Hesse, Six "Small" Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch, Remarks as Prepared for
the ITU-T Patent Roundtable, DEP'T OF JUST. 4 (Oct. 10, 2012),
https://wwwjustice.gov/atr/file/518951/download ("Today, interoperability standards underpin myriad
improvements in our lives including the exchange and protection of health information, the use of smart
grids for the delivery of electricity and the mobile communication devices that have become hallmarks of
our time.").
3 Id. at 4-5.
* See Andrew Updegrove, The Essential Guide to Standards, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG § 2.1,
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/participatingl.php (last visited July 17, 2017).
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provide a firm with a more seamless transition in ramping up for the design
and manufacture of standards-compliant products and services.40
Additionally, SSO participants may receive beneficial training and other
information about the new technology and may be able claim certification in
the standard." These benefits are particularly important because
participation in an SSO is voluntary and expensive.42 There are multiple
costs associated with being a part of an SSO, including membership dues as
well as significant numbers of hours spent at, and preparing, for SSO
meetings. 43 Additionally, SSO participants that contribute technology to the
SSO with the hope of it being incorporated in the standard incur research and
development costs with uncertain return on the investment.' The advantages
afforded to SSO participants must be great enough to offset these costs,
otherwise participation may suffer.
Once a technology standard is developed, benefits for implementers
accrue. Implementers are firms that incorporate standardized technology into
their products.45 Implementers, as a category, may include SSO participants,
but also includes firms that did not participate in the standard setting process
yet wish to offer products or services that incorporate the technology of the
standard.46 Implementers have a distinct advantage because the specifications
and other technical data for their project are already set by the standard. This
allows implementers to realize a marketable product at lower costs and often
via a more simplified design process. 47  Additionally, although there are
certainly risks that consumers may reject any given standards-compliant
product or even the standard itself, it is a much smaller risk than if an
implementer develops and markets a product independently.48 Particularly
in cases of standards directed to interconnectivity and interoperability, the
' Stoll, supra note 23.
41 See Updegrove, supra note 39.
42 Id. § 2.
4 See id. § 4.2.1. The costs of the most influential levels of membership in SSOs typically costs
between $10,000 and $60,000, but a few have dues ranging upwards from $200,000 to $1 million. See id.
Most SSOs, however, offer multiple membership classes; some with lesser influence can be significantly
less expensive.
In terms of man hours, some SSOs limit voting rights to participants with good attendance records; others
require the dedicated services of one or more employees as a condition of membership of the classes with
the most influence. See id. Recently, some of these "costs" of participation have become less onerous
due to the development and use of remote meeting platforms and voting technology. See Id
" See id § 2.
0 See id § 2.1.
* See id § 3.2.4.
o See Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons from the Economics ofIncomplete
Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L. REv. 791, 793 (2014).
' See James C. DeVellis, Patenting Industry Standards: Balancing the Rights ofPatent Holders with
the Needfor Industry-Wide Standards, 31 AlPLA Q. J. 301, 305 (2003).
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implementer is further aided by network effects-a pipeline of customers that
want to purchase products that comply with the standard in order to maximize
their own beneficial use of the technology.4 9 Lastly, implementers can also
develop and compete for customers using innovative extra-standard features,
an activity that benefits all parties involved.5 o Although implementers may
need less incentive than SSO participants to adopt standardized technology,
the above-mentioned advantages are still essential to cultivate the critical
mass of implementers that gives rise to the favorable effects. The more
popular and technologically robust the standard (made possible through
diverse engagement of SSO participants), the more likely an implementer is
to adopt the standardized technology.
Consumers may benefit the most from technology standards. While
health and safety standards are specifically directed at consumers,
interconnectivity and interoperability standards also create immense benefits
for them as well. Standardization encourages horizontal competition,
enabling multiple firms to compete for customers." This can increase
manufacturing volume, and thus supply, and allows a variety of firms to offer
innovative products that are compatible with the standard at competitive
prices.52 Not only do consumers have a greater choice of manufacturers from
whom to purchase products that embody the technology standard," but they
can also purchase complementary products and auxiliary devices with
reassurance that these, and any, standard-compliant devices will work
together smoothly.54 This technological compatibility has the side benefit of
decreasing search costs for the consumer. 5 Further, consumers do not
become "locked in" to a particular manufacturer's product or, worse yet,
"stranded" if a manufacturer chooses to no longer make or support a
particular device; they are able to seamlessly continue by using products from
other manufacturers that follow the same standard.56 Additionally, with
standardized technology, users benefit from network effects. Specifically,
the more users of a technology that join a network, the more value that
4 See id.
"' See id at 307.
" See Benjamin M. Miller, FRAND-Encumbered SEPs and Injunctions: Why Section 5 of the F71C
Act is an Inappropriate Remedy, 16 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 452,460 (2015).
52 See, e.g., id at 460-61; see also Standard Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113' Cong. 3-4 (2013) (statement of Suzanne Munck, Chief Counsel for Intellectual Property,
Federal Trade Commission).
3 See Wright, supra note 47, at 793.
* See id.
* See Golden Bridge Tech., Inc., v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2008).
* See Wright, supra note 47, at 794.
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network provides to its users.57 In fact, the benefit derived from
interoperability is so great that the actual standard selected is often less
important than the simple fact that a standard exists and has been widely
adopted.
As an illustration of interoperability, consider the ubiquitous smart
phone. Whether you have a phone made by Apple or Google or Samsung,
you will be able to talk and text other people, regardless of what brand of
smart phone they use. You will be able to access Wi-Fi via the router in your
house, not matter what company manufactures that router-and you will be
able to hop onto Wi-Fi hotspots at the local library, coffee shop, and many
other places. When not on Wi-Fi, you will be able to access the LTE network,
whether you use Verizon, T-Mobile, or another cell phone service provider.
Technology standards make all these things, and so many other aspects of
modern life, possible.
The above benefits of standardized technology are true regardless of
whether the standard is set by government mandate, market choice, or SSO.
There are, however, additional benefits specific to voluntary consensus, or
SSO-developed, standards. An SSO-developed standard avoids the
"standards war" that often arises from market choice, allowing firms to avoid
significant costs by selecting the standard at an early phase of product
development, rather than after the product is fully developed and is already
being manufactured and sold.59 The "standards war," or competition between
firms seeking to become the standardized technology by winning market
selection, further requires firms to expend significant resources in trying to
attract the larger market share."o Moreover, when standards are set via market
selection, a clear winner does not always arise at the end of the day,
sometimes defeating the very interoperability and interconnectivity aspects
that standards are intended to create.61 If the competing products possess
distinct attributes and customers prefer that variety, there may instead be two
or more groups of co-existing, incompatible products rather than one
standard. 62  Additionally, when there are competing standards in the
marketplace, some consumers delay purchasing until after the de facto
" See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 32, at 237 (noting that interoperability enhances network effects,
or "the positive effects that emerge as more people use technology"); Lemley, supra note 28, at 1896-97.
* See Lemley, supra note 28, at 1897.
* See Joanna Tsai & Joshua D. Wright, Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Role
ofAntitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 157, 162 (2015).
' See Miller, supra note 32, at 359.
61 See, e.g., Hiram Melendez-Juarbe, DRM Interoperability, 15 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 181, 208
(2009).
62 See id
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standard is selected to avoid the costs of choosing the losing standard, either
having to use a suboptimal product or needing to buy a second product to
enjoy the benefits that come with standardization. 61 Some examples of the
fallout from standards wars include the Blu-ray-HD DVD battle, mentioned
above, where consumers refrained from buying players initially, hoping that
one technology would emerge as a standard, and the battle between Xbox and
PlayStation, where some consumers must purchase both gaming systems to
have access to the full range of desired games.*
2. Disadvantages
Any discussion of advantages without a corresponding mention of
disadvantages would be incomplete and disingenuous. There are three
primary areas where potentially negative aspects of standardization,
particularly voluntary consensus or SSO-developed standardization, may
occur. Specifically, some critics argue that standardization may have
negative effects or impacts on 1) innovation generally, 2) firms that
participate in standard setting activities, and 3) implementers and consumers
wishing to make and use products that incorporate technology covered by
standards.
First, standardization has been purported to delay further innovation or
even encourage stagnation in a particular technology sector.65 Because
standard setting is based on lengthy deliberations to achieve a level of
consensus among participants, there is inevitably some amount of delay and
bureaucracy that exists." However, the result of the delay is ideally an
optimal solution to a technological problem and is "worth the wait." Some
have also argued that standardization discourages further invention, resulting
in technology stagnation, because incentives to develop improved or
alternative technologies are lacking for firms inside and outside the standard
setting process.67 The premise of the argument is that once a standard is
developed, there is little motivation to continue innovating. This concern,
however, does not seem to be an actual problem, as evidenced by the great
amount of work being done in and around the area of current standards to
either improve upon or create "next generation" standards. One example of
63 See Tsai & Wright, supra note 59, at 162.
6 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
61 See Melonie L. McKenzie, How Should Competing Software Programs Marry? The Antitrust
Ramifications of Private Standard-Setting Consortia in the Software Industry, 52 SYRACUSE L. REv. 139,
141 (2002).
6 See id. at 155.
61 See id
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this continued innovation after standardization is the evolution from 3G to
4G, and now to the current work being done on the 5G communications
standard.68
Second, standardization may also have negative consequences for SSO
participants, or firms that participate in standard setting. These consequences
include wasted or lost resources, resulting from competition and free-riding.
Competition occurs within any given SSO, as well as potentially between
multiple SSOs working to solve the same technological problems. It is, in
fact, this competition that allows SSOs to derive the "best" solution. Firms
participate in these SSOs by developing and contributing technology for
consideration by the SSO; if the SSO does not select the technology a firm
develops, that firm may be seen to have wasted some resources. However,
the incentives that accrue to SSO participants, described above, help
ameliorate this concern.69 The negative impact of lost resources from
multiple competing SSOs, that is SSOs seeking to address the same
technological problem, is more difficult. Although each SSO will promote
its own standard, at some point it is likely that one standard will receive
widespread adoption while the other standard fades away.70 Some SSO
participants will participate in these multiple competing SSOs to hedge their
bets in this situation, but at an extra expense in membership dues, man hours,
and technology research and development. Other SSO participants will align
with only one of the competing SSOs, facing a marked disadvantage of
possibly having "spent their time and money adopting the 'obsolete'
standards" and may end up paying even more to license the new standard.7 '
Last, but not least, standard setting does create an incentive for free-riding,
allowing implementers of standardized technology to enter a technology
market with little cost to them but at the expense of SSO participants.7 2 This
too may be realized as a lost or wasted resource by the SSO participant, but
should often be outweighed by the many other benefits that are part of
participating in standard setting activities.
Third, standardization is said to have a negative impact on implementers
of products incorporating technology standards and consumers desiring those
8 See Paul Nikolich et al., Standards for 5G and Beyond: Their Use Cases and Applications, IEEE
5G (June 2017), https://5g.iece.org/tech-focus/june-2017/standards-for-5g-and-beyond (discussing the
development of 5G communications standards).
69 These benefits that ameliorate the concern are often overlooked by those proposing reforms. See
infra Section II.
7o Consider the parallel SSO tracks of 3GPP and 3GPP2 standards, which caused problems for SSO
participants and implementers alike. See, e.g., Junko Yoshida, Dual Paths to 3G a Vendor Headache, EE
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2001), http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc-id=l 143166.
' See McKenzie, supra note 66, at 155.
7 See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 19, at 4.
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products because it allows SSO participants to engage in unfair behavior.
The unfair behavior allegedly causes the production and purchases of these
products to be unduly expensive. Two main theories have been presented to
support this concern: patent hold-up and royalty stacking." Patent hold-up
theory hypothesizes that patent owners can use the possibility of an
injunction to force implementers to pay what is alleged to be excessively high
royalty rates to use the patented technology necessary to practice a standard.74
Royalty stacking theory hypothesizes that since final products incorporating
standardized technology, as sold to end users, incorporate a large number of
patented innovations from a variety of firms, inplementers are forced to pay
an excessive "stack" of royalties that far exceeds the value of the underlying
patented innovation.75 The premise is that, if an owner of one of these patents
requests a high royalty to allow use of a technology for which there is no
substitute, all other patent owners would seek higher royalties as well. This
cascade of higher royalties could then cause the total amount of royalty
payments necessary to implement the standard and manufacture the product
to skyrocket, resulting in a very high cost to the end user or a refusal by the
implementer to manufacture the product at all because the royalty payments
have become cost prohibitive.
Both patent hold-up and royalty stacking, however, are theoretical
problems. The existence and extent of patent hold-up and royalty stacking
have been questioned by numerous commentators due to a lack of evidence
and even evidence to the contrary.76 Despite this lack of evidence, many
courts and commentators are nonetheless striving to "fix" these alleged
problems; therefore, patent hold-up and royalty stacking will be described in
more detail below.
7 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup & Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REV.
1991, 2010-17 (2007).
" See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relieffor
Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley & Shapiro, 82 MiNN. L. REv. 714, 714 (2008) (citing Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 72, at 1992-93).
" See id (citing Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 1993).
76 See e.g., Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A
Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty-Stacking, and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EURO.
COMPETITION J. 101, 101-02 (2007); Kirti Gupta, The Patent Policy Debate in the High Tech World, 9 J.
COMPETITION L. & EcON. 827 (2013); F. Scott Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar, Incentive Effects from
Different Approaches to Holdup Mitigation Surrounding Patent Remedies and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1091 (2013).
Even the FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen has raised questions about whether these issues are
problems in fact or just in theory. "Patent-holdup theory drove the FTC's recent interventions into the
standard-setting arena ... Theory is all well and good, but what I did not see in [the cases I mentioned]
was evidence that an SEP owner's pursuit of an injunction actually caused patent holdup. It was merely
theorized." Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Federal Trade Commission's Path Ahead, 2 CRfERION J.
INNOVATION 31,33 (2017).
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a. Patent Hold-up
The concern behind patent hold-up in the technology standards space is
that patent owners could force firms wishing to implement a standard an
excessively high royalty rate to use the patented technology by relying on the
fear of injunctive relief if the implementer fails to pay the royalty.77 But
patent hold-up is just as theoretically possible in the absence of
standardization. Any time a property owner has a good that others want for
which there is no perfect substitute, the owner could seek excessively high
rates.' 8 There are numerous markets that exhibit this characteristic, and yet
market forces ensure that those seeking the good are able to fairly negotiate
for access. The fact that market forces have successfully prevented hold-up
in other circumstances helps underscore why the issue is simply theoretical
in the case of standard-essential patents (SEPs).
Although critics make it seem as though patent hold-up is a regularly
occurring phenomenon, it is by no means a natural by-product of
standardization. Rather, actual holdup requires both opportunity and action
by the patent holder.79 With respect to opportunity, simply owning an SEP
does not automatically create a situation where a patent holder can seek and
obtain excessive royalties. Additionally, not all patents are created equal.so
The value of the technology covered by the patent is what actually drives the
royalty rates, not a patent's designation as an SEP."' Ultimately, seeking
excessively high licensing rates poses many risks to patent owners that often
overshadow the opportunity to do so. For instance, standardization is often a
repeat-player game; if a patent holder acts in an unfair manner, it is unlikely
that other firms will be willing to urge adoption of that patent holder's
technology in future standard setting proceedings.82 Additionally, there are
risks for the patent holder in engaging in unfair negotiations with
implementers. These implementers may also hold SEPs that the patent holder
7 See, e.g, Sidak, supra note 75 (citing Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 72, at 1992-93).
7 See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable
Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1711 (2010) (discussing how non-infringing
substitutes or lack thereof should factor into calculation of royalty rates for patent infringement damages).
" See Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Damages:
Part 1, LAw360 (Oct. 8, 2014, 10:26 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/584906/methodologies-for-
calculating-frand-damages-part-1 [hereinafter Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for
Calculating FRAND Damages].
' See, e.g., Jean 0. Lanjuw et al., How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses
ofPatent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUs. EcoN. 405, 406 (1998) ("The importance of the
innovations protected by individual patents varies widely.").
s See Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Damages, supra note 78.
82 See Wright, supra note 47, at 802 (discussing the repeat-player nature of standards setting).
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may need to cross-license or may be important firms for commercializing the
patent holder's technology." For these reasons and others, the supposed
leverage of the patent holder to act unfairly is outweighed by many factors
that decrease the likelihood of patent hold-up.
It is also important to understand that hold-up is a phenomenon that can
occur on both sides of the licensing table. Hold-up requires lock-in.
Standard-implementing companies with asset-specific investments can be
locked into the technologies defined by the standards, but innovators that
contribute technology to the standard can also be locked in if their
technologies only have a market within the standard.' Patent owners can
also enjoy a first-mover advantage if their technology is adopted quickly
without time-consuming licensing battles: "As a result, patent owners who
manufacture products using standardized technology may fimd it more
profitable to offer attractive licensing terms in order to promote adoption of
the product using the standard, increasing demand for its product rather than
extracting high royalties."85
The flipside of patent hold-up is known as patent hold-out or reverse
hold-up.86 In these cases, the implementer may refuse to pay a reasonable
royalty.87 To more adequately capture this idea, some scholars are advancing
the term "patent trespass" instead of hold-out or reverse hold-up; specifically,
the term "captures the idea that the product of a technology implementer
involves a 'relatively gross invasion' over a technology developer's patent
claims."88 Because injunctive relief is often unavailable to SEP owners as
part of court and commentator efforts to "fix" patent hold-up, the patent
owner has little recourse other than to sue the refusing implementer for
" J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. CoMPETHON L. & ECON. 931
(2013) (explaining the value of cross-licensing to owners of SEPs).
* See Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren Wong-Ervin, An Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Decision in
Ericsson v. D-Link, CPI ANTrrRUST CHRON., Mar. 2015, at 1, 6,
https://www.crai.comf/sites/default/files/publications/An-Analysis-of-the-Federal-Circuits-Decision-in-
Ericsson-v-D-Link.pdf [hereinafter Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, An Analysis of Ericsson].
"s Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the US. Senate Committee on the
Judiciary Concerning "Standard Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law ", FED. TRADE COMM'N 6
(July 30, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/publicstatements/prepared-statemetn-
federal-trade-commission-conceming-standard-essential-patent-disputes-
and/130730standardessentialpatents.pdf.
* See Kieff& Farrar, supra note 77, § IV(C).
8 See id.
* See Bowman Heiden & Nicolas Petit, Patent Trespass and the Royalty Gap: Exploring the Nature
and Impact of 'Patent Holdout' 30 (Hoover IP2, Working Paper No. 17010, 2017),
http://hooverip2.org/working-paper/wpl7Ol0/. Heiden & Petit go on to theoretically and empirically
examine the phenomenon of patent trespass, concluding "strong empirical backing to the theoretical
proposition." See id. at 57.
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payment of a reasonable royalty .. . the same thing it was seeking in the first
instance.89 In theory, this would be the rational strategy of all implementers.
As noted earlier, there is little to no empirical evidence of patent hold-up
and no real-life examples the phenomenon or its supposed effects on
innovation-it is a largely theoretical concern. Interestingly, however, there
is work that contradicts the theory. For example, a recent paper by Galetovic
and Haber demonstrates that the patent hold-up theory is based on a set of
fallacies that undermine the viability of the theory." Another paper
empirically examines the alleged result of patent hold-up--slowing of
innovation-and finds no support for the phenomenon.91 Although this
phenomenon is, at best, a theoretical problem and may not be a problem at
all, courts and commentators continue to try to "solve" patent hold-up.
b. Royalty Stacking
Royalty stacking theory hypothesizes that many suppliers may sell
complementary inputs to downstream firms, act non-cooperatively, and set a
linear price, thereby charging more for the bundle of inputs than a single
monopolist would because each supplier ignores that increasing her price
reduces the profits of all other suppliers.9 2 This problem is theoretically
possible in the standardized technology arena, as many standard-compliant
products incorporate technology from hundreds, if not thousands, of SEPs,
owned by many different patent owners. In theory, excessive royalty rates
can be stacked upon each other and result in an unsustainably high charge. 9 3
Royalty stacking is alleged to slow down product introduction, increase
prices paid by consumers, and slow or derail subsequent innovation, with the
ultimate downfall being market collapse. 94
Data regarding royalty stacking is difficult to find because patent royalty
rates are often protected by confidentiality agreements. Furthermore, even if
'9 See, e.g., Kieff& Layne-Farrar, supra note 77; Gregory J. Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part II:
Injunctions, II J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 201, 236 (2015).
' See Alexander Galetovic & Stephen H. Haber, The Fallacies of Patent Holdup Theory (Hoover
IP2, Working Paper No. 16009,2017), http://hooverip2.org/working-paper/wpl6009/.
9' See Alexander Galetovic et al., An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-up (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21090, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2583169. ("[T]he rate of innovation-as reflected
in quality adjusted relative prices--has rarely, if ever, been faster than it is today in exactly those products
that scholars agree are theoretically subject to . . . [patent] hold-up.").
9 See Alexander Galetovic & Kirti Gupta, Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential Patents: Theory
and Evidence from the World Mobile Wireless Industry 2 (Hoover I P2, Working Paper No. 15012, 2015),
http://hooverip2.org/working-paper/wp 15012/.
9 See id. at 2.
9 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 2022.
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actual royalty rates are known, it would be difficult to determine what, if any,
portion of the royalties are attributable to stacking of excessive royalties. As
an example, consider the mobile phone industry. Estimates of royalty burden
on products implementing ETSI's 3G GSM standard range from 10/-40%
of the end product price and an estimated aggregate royalty burden on ETSI's
4G LTE standard of about 15% of the end product price.15  Others have
estimated the royalty "stack" on smart phone devices to be, absent cross-
licensing, about $122 of the end product's price.96
However, whether these numbers, or even a portion of these numbers,
are excessive is unknown. Instead, the only way to determine whether
excessive royalty rates are being charged is to examine whether the expected
negative effects are being seen, such as stagnating innovation and increased
pricing. The determination of excessive royalty rates is further complicated
because the appearance of excessive rates could instead be caused by the
aggregate royalty burden, which simply reflects the accumulation of
necessary SEPs and a burden that includes supra-competitive rates.97 In any
other industry, aggregate input costs are rarely given a second thought;
consider the input costs of the many components needed to produce a car. 98
As long as the inputs for multi-component products are priced according to
the value of the patented contribution to the end product, no SEP holder can
be faulted either for hold-up or stacking.9
Looking at evidence in the mobile communications space, it appears that
royalty stacking is not happening. For example, royalty stacking theory
predicts that, as the number of SEP owners grows, sales of phones will
decline (or at least stagnate despite increased quality of the technology). 1to
However, between 1994 and 2013, sales of mobile communication devices
9' See Erik Stasik, Royalty Rates and Licensing Strategies for Essential Patents on LTE (4G)
Telecommunications Standards, LES NOUVELLES, Sept. 2010, at 114, 114.
96 See Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller & Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone Royalty Stack:
Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modem Smart Phones 68 (2014) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/SharedContent/Editorial/Publications/Documents/The-
Smartphone-Royalty-Stack-Armstrong-Mueller-Syrett.pdf This study has been challenged by Keith
Mallinson and Anne Layne-Farrar. See Kieth Mallison, Smartphone Revolution: Technology Patenting
and Licensing Fosters Innovation, Market Entry, and Exceptional Growth, IEEE CONSUMER ELECTRICS
MAG., Apr. 2015, at 60; Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence:
Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of History?, OECD.ORG (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.oecd.orgofficialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD/`282014%2
984&docianguage=en.
' See Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, An Analysis Ericsson, supra note 85.
' See id.
* See id.
a See Galetovic & Gupta, supra note 93, at 4.
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experienced a 62-fold increase.o' Richard Epstein puts it even more
colorfully, stating that the "notion that implementers ... are being suffocated
by an insurmountable patent royalty stack has turned out to be nothing more
than horror fiction" and supports his claim pointing to multiple large
companies that have recently entered the mobile communication device
field.1 02
Similarly, royalty stacking theory predicts that as the number of SEP
owners grows, the price of devices will increase or (if quality increases
demand) at least stagnate.'0o However, between 1994 and 2013, the average
price of mobile devices fell between -11.4% and -24.8% a year.10 Royalty
stacking theory predicts that as the number of SEP owners grows, SEP
owners' and downstream manufacturers' profit margins will fall, but
researchers found no downward trend in gross margin.' And finally, royalty
stacking theory predicts that as the number of SEP owners grows, the number
of device manufacturers will decrease and industry concentration will rise. 06
The exact opposite appears to be happening; the number of device
manufacturers has increased from one in 1994 to forty-three in 2013, and the
concentration has fallen. 0 7
Despite the uncertainty about the existence and extent of these concerns,
courts and commentators are still striving to "fix" patent hold-up and royalty
stacking. Section M below explains how courts and commentators are
attempting to address these problems and why the solutions are worse than
the actual problem. In part, the solutions fail because they are based on a
distinct lack of understanding of how standard setting organizations actually
function. The next part of this article seeks to explain how SSOs work with
the intention to alleviate the knowledge deficit surrounding them.
101 See id at 5. In 1994, there was one manufacturer that sold 29 million phones; by 2013, there were
fourty-three manufacturers that sold 1,810 million phones. See id.
102 See Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for "Patent Holdout" Threaten to
Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters 27 (Hoover IP2, Working Paper No. 17006, 2017),
https://hooverip2.org/wp-content/uploads/ip2-17006-paper-i.pdf
1os See Galetovic & Gupta, supra note 101, at 4.
'0 See id at 5.
105 See id
'" See id
107 See id For an excellent summary of Galetovic & Gupta's paper, see Devil Hartline & Matthew
Barblan, Deunking the Royalty Stacking Theory: Real-World Evidence from the Mobile Wireless Industry,
CTR. PROTECTION OF INTELL. PROP. (Jan. 2016), https://sis.gmu.edu/cpip/wp-
content/uploads/sites/31/2016/01/Harline-Barblan-Debunking-the-Royalty-Stacking-Theory.pdf.
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B. How SSOs Operate
The purpose of an SSO is to solve a technological problem or reach a
desired technical outcome, be it related to interoperability, safety, or some
other criteria."o To achieve this purpose, SSO participants engage in an
extended and iterative process that involves both collaboration and consensus
building. To better understand this process, this subpart first looks at what
types of entities participate in SSOs. Next, the logistics and mechanics of
standard setting are explored to explain how SSO participants collaborate and
build consensus. Finally, this subpart concludes by discussing a number of
relevant policies and procedures that govern SSO operations, particularly
those that have been implicated in the negative aspects of standardization,
including patent hold-up and royalty stacking.
The makeup of participants in any given SSO is diverse. However, there
are a few discrete categories into which most participants will fall: firms,
universities, government, individuals, and public interest groups.'0 Firms
are by far the most prevalent group. Most SSOs include a large number of
private companies, many of which may be competitors with each other.1 o
Although this group is the most numerous, it is also the most heterogeneous.
Firms that participate in SSOs include companies devoted to technology
development, companies that manufacture components, companies that
manufacture or market consumer products, companies that provide services
or infrastructure, and companies that do any mix of the above."' Universities
and government agencies also regularly participate in SSOs, although with
less frequency than private firms, given the limited budgets under which
these entities often operate.112 SSOs have varying rules about whether
individuals are permitted to participate, with many SSOs prohibiting
individual participation.113 Finally, public interest groups or other non-profit
organizations may be SSO participants, although their participation is more
common with SSOs that are directed towards health and safety issues.1 4
These diverse participants work together to develop standards through a
complicated process, which from the outside may seem a bit like sausage
'" See Daniel S. Sternberg, A Brief History ofRAND, 20 RU. J. SCI. 211, 223 (2013).
'" See Updegrove, supra note 39, § 3.2.
10 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 32; Updegrove, supra note 39, § 3.2.1; see also Lemley, supra note
28, at 1947 ("[SSOs] are built on agreement among horizontal competitors.").
". See Updegrove, supra note 39, § 3.21.
112 See Miller, supra note 32, at 364 (noting that members of SSO working groups include "volunteers
from the interested firms (and sometimes from government agencies and academic departments) who are
technical, not legal or business, experts"); Updegrove, supra note 39, §§ 3.2.2-3.2.3.
"' See Updegrove, supra note 39, § 3.2.4.
" See id. § 3.2.5.
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making-a mix of stuff goes in and a single cohesive thing comes out that is
better than the sum of its parts. Sausage making, however, is much less
complicated. At any given point during the standard setting process, which
often takes multiple years, there are many levels of activities occurring
involving a variety of different actors. For one example, consider the Third
Generation Partnership Project, or 3GPP. This organization was formed in
1998 to develop a common wireless system for Europe, Asia, and North
America."' It brought together seven telecommunication SSOs and is
responsible for generating the standards endorsed by the member SSOs. 116
One of the seven SSOs, ETSI, is in charge of the day-to-day management of
3GPP."' Membership is voluntary and members choose the technologies
that become standards by consensus or majority voting."' Nearly 500
organizations participated in the development of the standards, spending
around 3.5 million man-hours attending some 850 working group
meetings.119
Most SSOs will have an overarching technology theme-such as 3GPP
telephony or Wi-Fi. Under that penumbra, there are usually a number of sub-
tracks or groups concerned with addressing particular objectives or solving
specific issues within that technology space. For example, the 3GPP SSO
has four technical specification groups, each organized around a particular
technical area within mobile telephony.'2 0 The objectives for the subgroups
are then further broken into a multitude of specific goals or features, each
representing an aspect or functionality to be added to the standard.' 2 ' These
specific goals are then assigned to a particular working group.'22 It is within
these smaller working groups that most of the technical activity occurs.1 23
A common misunderstanding about SSOs is the belief that much of the
work is done by business and legal experts. In reality, the working groups,
where the true work of the SSOs is done, are generally comprised of
engineers and technical experts, as the emphasis of any working group's
".. See, e.g., Kirti Gupta, How SSOs Work: Unpacking the Mobile Industry's 3GPP Standards (Nov.
2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract-3063360.
116 See id.
"' See id.
118 See id.
" See id.
120 See Justus Baron et al., Unpacking 3GPP Standards § 4.1 (Nw. L. & Econ., Research Paper No.
18-09, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3119112. The four technical
specification groups (TSGs) include RAN (Radio-Access Network), SA (Service and System Aspects),
CT (Core Network and Terminals), and GERAN (GSMIEDGE Radio Access Network). Id.
121 See id.
122 See id
'" See id
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activity is seeking the best technological solution to implement a specific
feature or solve a given problem.124 Consider this description of the activity
and participants involved with W3C (World Wide Web Consortium), a
standards organization devoted to internet issues: "Historically, W3C and
IETF have viewed their role as primarily limited to technical protocols" and
have focused "their activities to closely align with the skills and roles of
computer scientists and engineers."25 Technology is always at the front and
center of standard setting, even where the issue moves beyond the strictly
technical. For example, working group discussions may involve the societal
impact and policy issues created by technology, such as concerns of privacy
regarding the internet.'2 6 At bottom, the real issue is always the technology.
This focus on developing technical protocols and assessing submitted
technology proposals is also one reason why some SSOs do not allow
participation by individuals, who may or may not have the technological
skills necessary to fully participate.' 2 7
Each SSO may have slightly different mechanisms, but standard setting
will proceed generally as follows. SSO participants can submit technological
proposals related to any open aspect or functionality being developed by the
SSO.12 8 The working group assigned to that aspect will then review and
evaluate the submitted technology proposals.'2 9 Through a series of
collaborative and iterative discussions that may involve accepting, rejecting,
and even seeking changes to the submitted technology proposals, the working
groups determine the best technologies to implement the relevant portion of
the standard.' 30 Working groups may meet multiple times a year, in person
or virtually, to discuss the merits of the various submitted technology
proposals.' 3 '
For example, working groups involved in the development of the 3GPP
standard met approximately six to eight times per year over the course of
multiple years.1 32 The submissions ultimately selected by a working group
124 See Sternberg, supra note 109, at 213-14.
125 See Nick Doty & Deidre K. Mulligan, Internet Multistakeholder Processes and Techno-Policy
Standards: Initial Reflections on Privacy at the World Wide Web Consortium, II J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 135, 140-141 (2013).
26 See id. ("[Plrotocols inevitably embed values and that they [the engineers] must consider the impact
of their protocols on important societal outcomes.").
127 See Baron et al., supra note 121.
128 For more information about how this works in one particular SSO, see Kirti Gupta, Technology
Standards and Competition in the Mobile Wireless Industry, 22 GEO. MASON L. REv. 865, 878 (2015).
129 See id
130 See id at 866.
1' See id at 878-79.
132 See id at 878.
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are then presented to the larger subgroup for that technical area, which may
result in further collaboration and iterative discussion of the merits. The
subgroups of the 3GPP standard met two to four times annually, again over
the course of many years, to consider the working groups'
recommendations. 13 3 To keep all of this simultaneous activity organized, the
working groups and subgroups may be coordinated by yet another group or,
alternatively, an administrative arm of the SSO.
The proposals submitted by SSO participants are known as contributions
and consist of technical specifications and details.' 34 It is not unusual for
hundreds of these contributions to be submitted and discussed in the process
of developing just one single technical aspect or feature of the much larger
standard."' Generally, the contributions are submitted in advance of working
group meetings and distributed to members of the working group. At
working group meetings, the contributions are presented and discussed by
the attendees. The purpose of these meetings is to reach consensus.3  To
achieve consensus, the discussions at these meetings may result in revisions
to the technical contributions in order to address any other member's
concerns. This process may take many iterations, multiple revisions, and
several months (or even years) to arrive at what ultimately becomes the
selected standard.'3 1 Interestingly, although each working group may be
populated by representatives from several different SSO participants, very
few firms actively submit contributions.1 38  Other SSO participants are
content to participate by reviewing, discussing, and helping choose from the
submitted contributions.
Technology underlying the contributions submitted by SSO participants
is often protected by patents or patent applications pending while the standard
is being developed.' 39 The status of the technology, vis a vis intellectual
property protection, however, is not the focus. The working groups
discussing the merits of technology contributions are generally engineering
or technical experts; the focus of these working groups is selecting the best
133 See id
134 See Baron et al., supra note 121.
13S See id.
136 See Gupta, supra note 129. In some SSOs, failure to reach consensus can be overcome by a
supermajority vote. See id.
"' See Baron et al., supra note 121. The authors of that paper have extensive data about the number
of contributions, man hours, etc., spent in developing various aspects of the 3GPP standard. See Baron et
al., supra note 119.
"' See Gupta, supra note 129, at 870-71. Gupta studied data from 3GPP standard setting activities
and found only approximately 30% of SSO participants made even a single technology contribution and
fewer still consistently submitted technology to the working groups. See id.
' NAS PATENT CHALLENGES, supra note 7.
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technological solution to achieve the desired outcomes, regardless of the
value that being incorporated into a standard would provide to any particular
company or individual.'4 0 During the discussion of standards technology at
the working group level, participants may not even know which SSO
participants have contributed technology covered by intellectual property
protection. 14 1 Some SSOs specifically discourage discussion of intellectual
property rights at this level to avoid antitrust liability. 142 As such, it is not
until after the standard is agreed upon and consensus is reached that patent
ownership and licensing concerns move to the forefront. 143
The existence of patents covering standardized technology can lead to
tension between the SSO participants holding patents and implementers of
standards-compliant products. Patent owners will rationally want to seek an
economic return on the investments made for research and development of
the technology they contribute to the standard, while implementers will
rationally hope to access the patented technology on the cheapest terms
possible." To address this tension as well as alleviate potential antitrust
concerns, SSOs utilize a number of policies to encourage transparency and
openness, particularly with respect to intellectual property rights.1 45
Policies regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) vary widely amongst
different SSOs. Unfortunately, many IPR policies began as ad hoc
arrangements and have been haphazardly amended, resulting in what are
often confusing and inconsistent documents.1 46 Regardless of what any given
SSO's IPR policy looks like, the two most salient issues for the purposes of
this discussion are disclosure of IPR and licensing of IPR. Disclosure
policies will describe whether and what amount of disclosure is required by
the SSO, as well as whether a firm is required to affirmatively search for
relevant intellectual property to disclose. 147 Licensing policies will describe
what licensing terms are permitted as well as what licensing terms are
required for SEPs.1 48  IIPR policies that govern the conduct of SSO
participants are enforceable contract commitments.1 49
'" See Miller, supra note 32, at 364-65.
141 See id. at 365.
142 See Lemley, supra note 28, at 275 ("[M]any SSOs discourage any discussion of patents or potential
licenses for fear of antitrust consequences.").
143 See Sternberg, supra note 109, at 213-14.
'" See id
i4 See Lemley, supra note 28, at 1959-60.
'46 See id. at 1956.
147 See id at 1943.
'" See id at 1973. Lemley also used these factors in an empirical study of SSO [PR policies. See id.
14. See Tsai & Wright, supra note 59, at 158.
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1. Disclosure and Search
Most SSO IPR policies have provisions requiring disclosure to the SSO
of relevant intellectual property held by each SSO participant.' Many SSOs
only require disclosure of patents known to a designated group of people,
such as the engineers participating in a working group or the company's legal
or patent department."s' Other SSOs also impose on participants an
affirmative duty to search their intellectual property portfolios to discover
potentially relevant rights.152 The purpose of disclosure and search
provisions is to avoid possible patent hold-up issues by permitting the SSO
to seek alternative technological solutions that may not be covered by patents
held by SSO participants.153 These disclosure and search provisions,
however, do not alert SSOs to IPR held by non-SSO participants.154
Whether the provision relates to disclosure or search, the inquiry seeks
to identify technology that is essential to practice the standard, or "standard
essential patents" (SEPs)."' Whether a technology is essential to practice a
standard can be construed literally, in that there is no other technological
alternative available to implement the standard, or commercially, if there is
instead no economically viable alternative.' 56 These determinations of the
essential nature of technology are made by the patent owners and are not
generally reviewed by the SSO.1'
One problem with these disclosure and search provisions is the wide
variety and ambiguity in rules. Some ways these provisions vary between
SSOs include whose patents must be disclosed, what qualifies as an essential
patent claim, when disclosures must be made during the standards
development process, whether blanket (non-patent specific or non-claim
'" See id.
"5i See Jorge L. Contreras & Andrew Updegrove, A Practical Guide to Patent Policies of Standards
Development Organizations, STANDARDS ENGINEERING, Nov.-Dec. 2015, at 1, 3.
152 See id.
153 See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 19, at 11-12.
"4 See id. at 12.
i' "[A] patent is considered standard essential when it is declared or incorporated into an industry
standard ... subsequently requiring manufacturers to license the patent for any technology that implements
the standard." MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN, COMM'R, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, FED. TRADE COMM'N 2 (2013).
'" See Contreras & Updegrove, supra note 152, at 3. Contreras and Updegrove note that some SSOs
restrict "essential" claims to those that are "required or mandatory elements" of the standard but not to
optional elements while other SSOs consider a patent essential if necessary to implement the entire
standard. See id. They further note that some SSOs define "essential" to mean "technically essential"
(i.e., a product cannot conform to the standard without infringing) while other SSOs include
"commercially essential" (i.e., a standard cannot be implemented in a commercially viable way without
infringing). See id.
'5 See id.
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specific) disclosures are sufficient, to whom the disclosed information is
provided, and whether there is an obligation to update disclosures, for
example, as the standard evolves or if a patent issues or is ultimately
denied.'5 Policies also differ as to whether disclosure requirements refer to
only patents or also to pending applications. 159 The variety and uncertainty
of requirements can increase the cost for SSO participants to comply,
especially if they participate in multiple different SSOs, each having differing
obligations.
Even where the disclosure and search provisions are perfectly clear, these
requirements place significant burdens on SSO participants, in terms of time
and resources required to identify and disclose essential patents.
Additionally, certain policy choices made with respect to these provisions
may increase or decrease the burden on SSO participants. One example that
impacts the burden significantly is whether the SSO participant can simply
disclose essential patents or whether the disclosure must identify particular
claims within each patent designated essential." Clearly it is a much higher
burden to read each identified patent and enumerate the claims implicated.
This burden increases exponentially for larger, more innovative firms holding
many possible SEPs. While small firms with few patents that participate in
only one or two SSOs may face only a small inconvenience for compliance,
the more typical example would be a large company with thousands of
patents in its portfolio that participates in multiple SSOs. In that case, the
burden can be extraordinary.' 61
It would seem that SSO participants would have an incentive to under-
disclose. After all, if the point of these provisions is to permit SSOs to select
technologies free from patent encumbrances, failure to disclose may increase
an SSO participant's chances of having its technology selected, allowing for
potential additional revenue streams associated with licensing. However,
there are significant penalties for non-designation of SEPs.'6 2 For example,
SSOs may require an SSO participant who failed to timely disclose SEPs to
grant royalty-free licenses on the non-disclosed patents to all
implementers.163 Courts may punish SSO participants for failure to disclose,
5 See NAS PATENT CHALLENGES, supra note 7, at 4.
'" See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 19, at 11.
6 See Contreras & Updegrove, supra note 152.
.6. See id. ("For such companies, conducting a conscientious patent review in connection with every
draft standard could consume the full time of a very large team of attorneys."); see also Kesan & Hayes,
supra note 32, at 245.
162 See Contreras & Updegrove, supra note 152, at 4-5.
163 See id. at 3. SSOs may also impose other penalties, such as suspension of participation or rejection
of technical contributions. See id. at 5.
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for example, by holding non-disclosed SEPs to be unenforceable or declining
to issue an injunction for infringement of these patents.'" Firms also have
significant incentives to maximize the number of SEPs they hold.165  The
penalties for non-disclosure and the incentives to disclose may actually result
in over-disclosure. 166 Additionally, the policies of the SSOs themselves may
contribute to over-disclosure in requiring participants to declare all patents
that might potentially be considered an SEP.1 67
2. Licensing
In addition to disclosure and search policies, SSOs use licensing
provisions to ease tensions between patent-owning SSO participants and
implementers wishing to make and sell products that embody the
standardized technology. The most important provisions are those that
require SSO participants to license their patented technology to any,
implementer for either a reasonable royalty or for no royalty at all. Other
licensing terms may also be mandated or encouraged by SSOs.
SSO licensing provisions also vary widely and are some of the more
contentious issues with respect to SSOs today. As noted above, most SSOs
require participants to identify known SEPs. Although some SSOs will
attempt to create standards not encumbered by any patents, others will allow
technology covered by patents to be incorporated into a standard.'16  SSOs
that do not prohibit incorporation of SEP technology typically require the
patent holder to sign a Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND)
licensing commitment.1 6 9  This compromise allows participants to seek
patent rights for their technical contributions and investments made during
the standard setting process as an incentive to participate and contribute,
while still permitting other participants, and even non-participants, to
practice the resulting standard once developed. For example, the American
'64 See id at 5.
16s See id at 2.
166 See, e.g., Analysis of Patents Declared as Essential to GSM as of June 6, 2007, FAIRFIELD
RESOURCES, INC. (Dec. 31, 2007), http://frlicense.com/GSM FINAL.pdf; David J. Goodman & Robert
A. Myers, 3G Cellular Standards and Patents, I INT'L CONF. ON WIRELESS COMM. NETWORKING, &
MOBILE COMPUTING 415,415-18 (2005).
161 See Marc van Audenrode et al., Over-Declaration of Standard Essential Patents and Determinants
of Essentiality (Oct. 28, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=2951617.
i' See Contreras & Updegrove, supra note 152, at 2.
161 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 32, at 244. At least one federal judge has noted that "the word
'fair' adds nothing to 'reasonable' and 'nondiscriminatory."' See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 2d 901, 912 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner, J., sitting by designation), rev'd on other grounds, 757 F.3d
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The terms RAND and FRAND are often used interchangeably.
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National Standards Institute IPR policy states there is "no objection in
principle" to an American National Standard that includes "an essential claim
(one whose use would be required for compliance with that standard)" so
long as there are adequate technical justifications and so long as the patent
holder has provided a FRAND declaration.170 Similarly, the SSOs that
comprise the 3GPP organizations require firms to declare patents that are
potentially essential to implementation of the standards."'
Some SSOs provide guidance as to the meaning of "reasonable," while
others do not.172 in some cases, SSOs may require patent owners to make a
uniform FRAND assurance available to all implementers; other SSOs may
allow patent owners more freedom to license within the spirit of these
terms.'7 3 Regardless of how the FRAND commitment is expressed to the
SSO, after the standard is selected, SSO participants must then negotiate a
FRAND licensing rate with any implementer wishing to use the standardized
technology.'7 4 FRAND rates are determined on the facts of each case.1 75
Since FRAND contracts are willing agreements between highly competent
parties, "it logically follows that such agreements, correctly interpreted, must
generate valuable benefits to innovators and implementers alike."'76
On the other hand, some SSOs will include patented technology in a
standard only if the patent holder either agrees to grant royalty-free licenses
to implementers or agrees not to enforce its patent rights against
implementers of the standard. For example, the TPR policy for the W3C
standard states "to promote the widest adoption of Web standards ... [it] will
not approve a Recommendation if it is aware that Essential Claims exist
which are not available on Royalty-Free terms."l77 Much has been written
about FRAND issues, particularly from the perspective that FRAND
declarations exist to protect implementers; however, some more recent
literature is contradicting that viewpoint. 78 1 This misunderstanding of the
"o See ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for American National Standards,
AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST. § 3.1 (Jan. 2017),
https://share.ansi.org/shared%2Odocuments/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standar
ds/Procedures,%20Guides,%2Oand/`2OForms/2017_ANSIEssentialRequirements.pdf.
1' See Galetovic & Gupta, supra note 93, at 7.
7 See Tsai & Wright, supra note 59, at 7.
'" See id.
174 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 32, at 244.
175 See Contreras, supra note 15, at 172. Factors to be considered include market norms for royalties,
as well as non-monetary details such as grant backs, reciprocity, defensive suspension, and confidentiality.
See id (citing STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL 57 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007)).
7' Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 103, at 2.
'" W3C Patent Policy, W3C (Feb. 5, 2004), https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-
20040205/.
17 See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 103, at i ("An increasing number of judges, legislators and
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purpose of FRAND commitments is implicated in the reform proposals
discussed below.
Other policies related to licensing terms are even more varied and
potentially more ambiguous. Some of these terms include what specific
limitations are imposed by a commitment to FRAND; what is meant by the
terms fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory; whether a maximum royalty
must be posted ex ante; how FRAND applies to portfolio licenses and cross-
licenses; how non-royalty licensing terms (e.g., grant backs, geographical or
field use limitations, etc.) are treated; and whether royalty-free licensing is
encouraged or required."'
These varied and ambiguous terms can be quite problematic. Take, for
example, the recent movement by the Institute for Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) to require ex ante disclosure of licensing terms. IEEE is a
large organization, boasting over 400,000 individual members across the
world and engaging in a variety of activities, including professional
development and education.i8  Through the IEEE Standards Association
(IEEE-SA), the organization also engages in standard setting activities in
fields ranging from information and communication technology (ICT) to
networking to electrical power and more.'"' Prior to the 1990s, IEEE
permitted inclusion of patented technology in an IEEE standard if the patent
holder agreed to FRAND licensing terms and assured that "the technology
will be made available at nominal competitive costs to all who seek to use it
for compliance with [the] standard."'8 2 Disclosure of ex ante licensing terms
was permitted, but not required.'8 3 Later, the permissive disclosure clause of
the IEEE policy was removed; instead, in the policy version approved in
January 2005, disclosing the terms or costs of licensing specific patents was
specifically prohibited.'" IEEE members remained dissatisfied with the
vagueness of the organization's FRAND licensing provision and the inability
to compare costs when debating the merits of adopting a particular
technology, and so, in 2006, additional amendments were made to the policy,
scholars wrongly believe that the FRAND commitment was principally created to advance the interests of
technology implementers.").
' See NAS PATENT CHALLENGES, supra note 7, at 4.
"s See IEEE at a Glance, IEEE, https://www.ieee.org/about/today/ata_glance.html (last visited Apr.
5,2018).
"'1 See About the IEEE Standards Association, IIEE STANDARDS Ass'N,
http://standards.ieee.org/about/ieeesahtmi (last visited Apr. 5, 2018).
182 See Contreras, supra note 15, at 10-11.
183 See id
'` See id
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allowing optional ex ante disclosure of licensing terms.185 This remained the
stance of IEEE until 2015.
In 2015, however, and with the "encouragement and subsequent blessing
of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ," IEEE became the first SSO to closely
regulate FRAND royalty calculations and other licensing terms for patents
included in the SSO's standards. 186 The stated purpose of the amendments
to IEEE's patent policy was to address patent hold-up and royalty stacking,1 87
but the resulting changes went much further. Instead, the amendments
broadened the binding nature of the FRAND commitment made by SSO
participants, diminished the ability to enforce SEPs by restricting availability
of injunctive relief, and suppressed royalty rates that SEP owners would be
permitted to charge." Additionally these provisions recommend that
reasonable royalty rates be based on the smallest saleable patent practicing
component, a practice that is often used by courts but is misaligned with
normal licensing practices between businesses. 89
In general, the minimum goal of IPR policies, whether related to search
and disclosure or licensing, is to ensure that all essential patent claims are
reasonably known to SSO participants and are available for licensing to
implementers of the standardized technology.' 90 The flipside is that IPR
policies must not be too onerous or too vague for SSO participants to
comply;' 9' if SSO participants are unclear on how to satisfy the policies or
unhappy with burden associated with compliance, they may decline to
participate in standard setting. IPR policies must also not unfairly or
excessively diminish the rights that typically accompany ownership of
patents or innovative firms that regularly seek patents will be disinclined to
participate in SSOs. This is not simply an academic theory; empirical work
done by Ron Katznelson following the adoption of the IEEE IPR policy
amendments described above indicates a significant decline in participation
and the delay of some working groups due to failures to agree to the new
policies.' 92
85 See id.
" See Sidak, supra note 16, at 49.
'87 See id at 50.
'" See Sidak, supra note 16, at 50. Sidak argues that these provisions look potentially like price fixing
and other non-competitive behavior; IEEE sought and received a favorable business review letter from
the DOJ's Antitrust Division regarding these policies. See id at 50-51.
1" See id. at 59.
'9 See NAS PATENT CHALLENGES, supra note 7, at 4.
'9' Additionally, the SSO's policies must not be inconsistent with a firm's own policies. See, e.g.,
Contreras & Updegrove, supra note 152, at 1.
192 See Ron D. Katznelson, Presentation of IEEE's Controversial Policy on Standard Essential Patents
at the Symposium on Antitrust, Standard Essential Patents, and the Fallacy of the Anticommons Tragedy,
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When fewer firms participate in SSOs, it may weaken any standard that
results. 19 3 This decline in quality may be due to lesser contributions being
available for consideration, less rigorous discussions during the selection of
contributions to incorporate into the standard, or both. Studies have shown
that SSO participants do engage in "forum shopping" when deciding to
participate in an SSO and are more likely to choose SSOs with less rigid IPR
policies and other participant-friendly provisions.19 4 That said, SSOs also
must have policies that are attractive to implementers; after all, standards are
most valuable to everyone when adopted widely. 19 5
C. Examples of SSOs
SSOs exist in a wide range of industries, from ICT (Information and
Communications Technology) to health care to education and beyond. From
interoperability and interconnectivity to safety and specifications, the world
we live in today would be quite different without SSOs. This section
highlights a few different SSOs to illustrate the diversity and importance of
the roles SSOs play in our society.
As noted above, one well known SSO is 3GPP, or the Third Generation
Partnership Project. Standards developed and maintained by this SSO have
become a household name, as we regularly use the terms 4G and LTE to talk
about our ever-present wireless phones. Some of the member firms develop
communications technology, while others create products utilizing the
technology.19 ' These firms may make devices, such as smartphones or
tablets, or network infrastructure, such as base stations and servers. 197 Still
other member firms specialize in deploying large networks or providing
wireless services to customers.' It is from this wide membership pool that
technology contributions are received, based on that particular members'
expertise. Without the standards developed by 3GPP, we would likely not
Berkeley, CA (October 29,2016), http://bit.ly/IEEE-LOAs.
193 Although there are few instances of SSO participants leaving SSOs, the possibility is quite real.
See, for example, the case of the SSO VITA, who adopted an ex ante disclosure policy in 2007. See
Contreras, supra note 15, at 174-75. Motorola opposed this policy, arguing that the policy would
discourage participation and result in lower quality standards. See id. When the policy was adopted,
Motorola withdrew from participating in VITA. See id
'9 See Tsai & Wright, supra note 59, at 161 (discussing Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, A Model ofForum
Shopping, 96 Am. ECON. REV. 1091 (2006)).
's See Tsai & Wright, supra note 59, at 168.
* See Galetovic & Gupta, supra note 93, at 19.
' See id
"' See id
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enjoy the level of interconnectivity and interoperability we enjoy using our
wireless devices.
Another SSO mentioned above is the IEEE, or Institute for Electrical and
Electronics Engineers. The IEEE traces its roots back to 1884 and early
professional engineering societies.' 99  Through the IEEE Standards
Association (IEEE-SA), the organization engages in standard setting
activities.20 0 IEEE standards cover a wide range of technologies, from
computer networking and communications, to electrical safety, equipment
disposal, batteries, Smart Grid technology, and transportation.20 1 Some of
"the best-known IEEE standards today are the 802.3 Ethernet standard series
and the 802.11 Wi-Fi wireless networking standards."2 02 These networking
standards have definitely changed the way we work and play as the level of
ubiquity of these standards supports our connected lifestyles. However, even
standards that are not as well-known also have great influence over how we
live and the technologies we enjoy. For example, some IEEE standards also
cover, among other things, the batteries that power our connected gadgets as
well as safety aspects of these electronic devices.203
Although the standards that are most familiar to people are in the
information and communications technology space, especially as related to
consumer electronics generally and mobile telephony, nearly every area of
our lives benefits from SSOs and the standards these organizations create.
Some of these standards make our lives easier or more convenient by
facilitating interconnectivity or interoperability behind the scenes. One
example is the Health Level Seven International (HL7) standards that define
how electronic medical information is structured and shared between health
care systems.2 0 These standards enhance our experience by allowing a
primary doctor to share information with an emergency room doctor, or a
medical imaging facility, or the billing department, and more without
requiring the patient to repeat his medical history or insurance data at every
step of the treatment process. 205 Other standards are important to ensure our
'" See Jorge L. Contreras, An Empirical Study ofthe Effects ofEx Ante Licensing Disclosure Policies
on the Development of Voluntary Technical Standards 10 (Nat'l Inst. of Standards and Tech., Working
Paper No. GCR 11-934, 2011), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id-1916743.
' See id
201 Id
202 Id
203 See, e.g., IEEE/AIEE 36-1928-AIEE Storage Batteries (Revised), IEEE,
https://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/36-1928.htmi (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (describing just one
of many types of standards related to batteries by the IEEE).
204 See About HL7, HEALTH LEVEL SEVEN INT'L, http://www.hl7.org/aboutlindex.cfm (last visited
Apr. 5, 2018).
205 For a short video explaining how HL7 standards work, see iNTERFACEWARE, How Does HL7
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safety and comfort. One example is the standards developed and maintained
by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA has standards
covering everything from fire extinguishers and sprinkler systems to safety
systems for parking garages and dry-cleaning facilities to processing and
storing flammable materials, and more.2 While we may be less familiar
with these, and other, standards, it is clear that standards touch and improve
many aspects of life today.
With a better understanding of SSOs and how essential these
organizations and the standards they develop and maintain are to everyday
life, this article will now turn to patent pools.
III. PATENT POOLS
Unlike SSOs, which are convened to solve technological problems as
described above, patent pools exist to solve legal and business problems, such
as alleviating concerns about overlapping patent rights and providing one-
stop shopping for implementers of a certain technology.2 07 However, just as
many courts and commentators do not understand SSOs and how they
operate, these same courts and commentators do not understand patent pools
and, most importantly, how they differ from SSOs. In fact, courts and
commentators often conflate or confuse the two different entities. This
section will explain patent pools in some detail to help make the demarcation
between patent pools and SSOs clearer.
A. Benefits ofPatent Pools
A patent pool is "an arrangement under which patent holders in a
common technology or market commit their patents to a single holder who
then licenses them out to the original patentees and perhaps also to
outsiders."208 Patent pools are valuable because today's complex products
are generally assemblies of multiple separate components.2 09 It is not
uncommon for each of these separate components to be covered by one or
Work?, YOUTUBE (Dec. 19, 2009), https://www.youtube.conVwatch?v-qewOJPxz4-c.
206 See List of NFPA Codes and Standards, NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION,
http://www.nfpaorg/Codes-and-Standards/All-Codes-and-Standards/List-of-Codes-and-Standards (last
visited Apr. 5, 2018).
207 See Sternberg, supra note 109, at 223-24.
' See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Pools and Related Technology Sharing, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND HIGH TECH § 18 (Roger
Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract-2645905.
' See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Michael Mattioli, Measuring the Costs and Benefits ofPatent Pools,
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 281, 284 (2017).
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more patents, and these patents may be held by many different companies.210
In order for a manufacturer of the complex product to legally assemble the
product, he must obtain a license from each of the many varying companies
to make, use, and/or sell the component technology. 2 1' As can be imagined,
it may be expensive in terms of time and money to obtain these licenses-a
business problem. In fact, if the transaction costs are too high, it may not be
feasible to procure the necessary licenses. In that case, a manufacturer has to
choose between not making the product at all or risking patent infringement
liability for going forward without permission. Similarly, the multiple
patents of varying scope held by diverse patent owners can result in
overlapping patent rights-a legal problem. Patent pools exist to address
these issues and other coordination problems.2 12
This phenomenon of patent rights held by multiple, diverse patent owners
is not unusual in fields where technology standards are present. This is
because each of the SSO participants who contribute technology that is
incorporated into the standard may have one or more patents covering
varying aspects of the standard. Before making, using, or selling a standards-
compliant product, an implementer would similarly need to obtain a license
from each of the many varying SSO participants who hold SEPs, or else that
implementer may be liable for patent infringement. Although SSOs and
patent pools are different entities with different purposes, there is a symbiotic
relationship between the two. Specifically, patent pools that include SEPs
enable competitive production of standards-compliant products by
facilitating implementer access to the necessary technology.2 13 Patent pools
for SEPs are not formed before a standard is selected; rather these patent
pools form late in the standardization cycle.214
Patent pools have emerged as a popular mechanism for sharing
intellectual property.215 Over $100 billion of sales are generated each year in
the United States from products or devices that are based in whole or in part
on technologies in patent pools. 2 16 Not only are patent pools a major force in
today's innovation economy, they also offer benefits to firms that contribute
210 See id.
211 See id.
212 See Justus Baron & Tim Pohlman, The Effect of Patent Pools on Patenting and Innovation -
Evidence from Contemporary Patent Standards 1 (Jan. 30, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db-name=IIOC2015&paper id-405.
213 See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 209.
214 See Baron & Pohlman, supra note 213, at 12.
215 See Nancy Gallini, Cooperating with Competitors: Patent Pooling and Choice ofa New Standard,
36 INT'L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 4, 4 (2014).
216 See Gavin Clarkson & David deKorte, The Problem ofPatent Thickets in Convergent Technologies,
1093 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 180, 188 (2006).
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patents to the pool (patent contributors), firms that license patent rights from
the patent pool (licensees), and consumers. With respect to patent
contributors, patent pools provide compensation in the form of licensing
revenue at a decreased cost because the patent contributor does not need to
engage in separate licensing negotiations with multiple parties.217 Similarly,
licensees benefit from "one stop shopping," which decreases their transaction
costs. Patent contributors that are also manufacturers or implementers can
benefit from access to the technology as a licensee in addition to receiving
revenue as a contributor. Further, patent pools can alleviate concerns (even if
these concerns are poorly founded) of patent hold-up and royalty stacking.2 1 8
Finally, consumers benefit from the cost-savings realized by both the patent
owners and licensees, as well as improved product quality and variety.2 19
Beyond these direct benefits related to solving the business problem of
patent rights held by multiple, diverse patent owners, patent pools provide a
second significant advantage. For both patent contributors and licensees,
patent pools provide an efficient solution to the difficult legal problem of
identifying boundaries, especially in a situation of potentially overlapping
rights.22 0 Developers and manufacturers tend to know their own technology
and products well, but they may be less certain about which patents owned
by others cover their products.22 1 Identifying what patents cover which
products, whether for enforcement in the case of patent contributors or to
avoid infringement in the case of licensees, is expensive; failure to identify
the boundaries correctly can be even more costly.2 2 2 Because patent pools
give members access to all the patents in the pool, patent contributors and
licensees do not need to determine boundaries at the individual patent or
patent holder level because the patent pool provides access to all included
patents. 223 This, too, decreases costs to all parties involved.
Patent pools are sometimes believed to be anti-competitive. After all,
they are often arrangements between competitors that could in theory
artificially raise prices or encourage some other collusive behavior. 2 24 There
are, however, numerous pro-competitive benefits, such as reducing
transaction costs, eliminating the increased costs of patent overlap, and
217 See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 210, at 317-18.
21 See id. at 285 ("[P]atent pools reduce the odds that any patent holder, aware that its permission is
necessary to a licensee, will strategically hold out for exorbitant licensing fees.").
"' See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 209.
220 See id.
- See id.
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 210, at 298-99.
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providing a private mechanism for settling patent infringement litigation. 2 5
At least one recent study of patent pools has found these pro-competitive
benefits to vastly outweigh any potential anti-competitive risks posed by
patent pools. Specifically, Merges and Mattioli found patent pools save
companies "enormous amounts of money" based on the "mind-blowingly
efficient" manner in which patents can be licensed.2 26 Because of this,
Merges and Mattioli posit that proposed patent pools should be viewed as
pro-competitive unless there is actual, quantifiable harm to consumers caused
by an arrangement.227
B. How Patent Pools Operate
A patent pool, at its simplest, is an agreement between two or more patent
owners to offer a license on a set of related or complementary patents for a
single product.2 28 Although the patent owners who contribute patents to a
patent pool generally receive a license to use the bundled patents,2 29 patent
pools are not simply cross-licenses. Cross-licenses involve the bilateral
exchange of patent rights, while patent pools generally involve the pooling
of multiple patents from multiple owners.23 0 The bundled rights are then
licensed back to the patent contributors, to outside licensees, or to both.231
Patent pools can be organized in different ways. Some are operated as
corporations, where the patent contributors assign ownership of their patents
to the corporation in exchange for shares.23 2 Others are operated in a more
contractual fashion, with the patent pool consisting of myriad agreements
between the patent contributors and licensees.233 Jonathan Barnett indicates
that patent pools can be categorized by reference to three parameters:
directional relationship, asset flows, and management function.23 4
Directional relationships within patent pools can be horizontal or vertical.235
As Barnett notes, there will always be a horizontal relationship between
225 See Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 283 U.S. 163 (1931); Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 19, at 40.
_ See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 210, at 288-89.
227 See id.
228 See id. at 296.
229 See id at 285.
230 See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 19, at 40. Some patent pools, however, are defined by a
multiplicity of cross-licenses that define the cooperative arrangement. See Merges & Mattioli, supra note
205, at 314.
231 See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 210, at 296.
232 See id.
233 See id.
234 See Johnathan M. Barnett, From Patent Thickets to Patent Networks: The Legal Infrastructures of
the Digital Economy, 55 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 13-15 (2014).
235 See id
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patent contributors; in some cases there will also be a vertical relationship
between the pool and licensees. 23 6 Similarly, there will almost always be
asset flows of intellectual property between patent contributors-each
member contributes patents or other IP assets to the pool in exchange for
access to other members' IP assets.237 Where there are external licensees,
there are also monetary asset flows from the licensees to the pool, which may
then allocate the revenue among the patent contributors.2 3 8 The third
parameter, management function, can either be handled internally by
members or externally by a third party administrator who is generally paid
for its efforts.239 Although there are certainly other ways that patent pools
can be structured and other parameters that can be used to distinguish one
from another, these typical structures and standard parameters do the bulk of
the descriptive work when considering patent pools.
One important benefit of patent pools, as noted above, is the ability of
patent contributors to realize licensing revenue based on their contributions.
This is also one area where patent pools differ greatly from each other. How
much revenue is allocated to each contributor varies widely. Some patent
pools divide their revenue based strictly on ex ante agreement between the
founding contributors; oftentimes these arrangements do not permit any new
patents to be added to the pool.2 40 Other pools, particularly those set up as
corporations, pay patent contributors in the form of corporate dividends; the
distribution amounts are then calculated by the officers of the business
organization.2 4' Finally, and most common today, are more formulaic
determinations of revenue share. Each patent pool has one or more individual
evaluators who verify that a particular patent should be added to the pool and
then apply a profit-sharing formula to determine the patent contributor's
share.2 42 Some of the formulas are simple pro rata equations. 243 For example,
the MPEG-2 patent pool, which covers patents related to digital video
technologies, allocates royalties based on the following formula: (P/N) x
M.2" P is the number of MPEG-2 portfolio patents held by the patent
contributor in the country at issue and N is the total number of MPEG-2
236 See id
237 See id. Additionally, there may be horizontal monetary flows ifsome members make side payments
to reflect the difference in value of their intellectual property contributions. See id.
238 See id
239 See id
" See Michael Mattioli, Power and Governance in Patent Pools, 27 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 421, 440
(2014).
241 Seeid
242 See id
243 See id at 446.
244 See id at 446-47.
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portfolio patents in that country.24 5 Other formulas are more complex and
may take into account value over time or other criteria. 24 6
Unlike SSOs, where working groups and committees meet regularly over
the course of many years to develop a technological standard, creation of a
patent pool is much simpler. For Via, a company that manages multiple
patent pools including the LTE patent pool and the 802.11 patent pool,
creation of a patent pool program is relatively simple and straightforward.24 7
During that time, the founding members of the patent pool are not solving
technological problems, but are instead reaching consensus amongst multiple
global firms with respect to licensing terms, such as the profit-sharing
formula to be used, and so on. 24 8
C Examples of Patent Pools
As noted above, patent pools can occur inside and outside of standardized
technology and in a variety of fields, although they are most common in
ICT.249 This section illustrates the above concepts by describing a few patent
pools in greater detail.
One patent pool that covers a popular consumer product is the DVD6C
Licensing Agency, a patent pool formed in 1999 between Toshiba, Hitachi,
Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Time Warner, and Victor Company of Japan to
coordinate licensing efforts for patents related to DVD technology.250
Toshiba Corporation acts as the licensor in the agreement.251 In exchange for
royalties, licensees are granted access to the DVD patents administered by
the agency.25 2 Additionally, all licensees must grant to each of the patent
245 Seeid
246 See id at 447.
247 See Licensing, VIA-CORP, http://www.via-corp.com/us/en/licensing.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2018); LTE Patent Pools Taking Shape, PCWORLD, https://www.pcworld.com/article/196721/article.html
(last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
2" See, e.g., Amy Dockser Marcus et al., Crisper Patent-Holders Move Toward Easing Access to
Gene-Editing Technology, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2017, 11:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/crispr-
patent-holders-move-toward-easing-access-to-gene-ediing-technology-1499527983; Press Release,
MPEG LA, MPEG LA Invites CRISPER-Cas9 Patents to be Pooled in a One-Stop License (Apr. 25,
2017),
http://www.mpegla.com/Lists/MPEG%2OLA%2ONews%20List/Attachments/103/CRISPRPatentCalPrs
Ris2017-04-25.pdf.
249 See Barnett, supra note 235, at 12 (presenting a table that illustrates common ICT standards and
the patent pools associated with those standards).
25 See David Serafino, Survey ofPatent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management
Structures 26-27 (Knowledge Ecology Int'l, Research Note 2007:6, 2007),
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/ds-patentpools.pdf
25 See id
252 See id
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contributors (and their licensees) a non-exclusive license to use any of their
patents-a grant back clause that provides an additional benefit to both patent
contributors and licensees.25 3 The US Department of Justice and the
European Commission both considered and approved the DVD6C patent
pool, based on the beneficial effect for consumers and licensees to deal only
with the pool, rather than multiple companies on an individual basis. 25 4
As another example, consider the well-known patent pools covering the
MPEG-2 and MPEG-4 video/system technology standards.2 55 These patent
pools are administered by MPEG-LA, a third party administrator that
supports a variety of patent pools. 25 6 MPEG-2 is a video compression
technology for digital television adopted as a standard by the Motion Picture
Expert Group (MPEG) International Standards Organization (ISO) in
1994 .257 The MPEG-2 Patent Pool was formed in 1997 after receiving a
favorable business review letter from the DOJ.258 The purpose of the MPEG-
2 Patent Pool is to offer one-stop shopping to license the technology required
to make MPEG-2 compliant products. 25 9 Specifically, the MPEG-2 Patent
Pool licenses, via non-discriminatory terms, essential MPEG-2 video and
systems patents held by a number of patent contributors, including Columbia
University, Fujitsu, GE Technology Development, LG Electronics,
Mitsubishi, Samsung, Sony, and many more. 260 The MPEG-2 Patent Pool is
credited with facilitating widespread adoption and use of MPEG-2
technology. 261  Similarly, MPEG-LA's MPEG-4 Patent Pool provides
convenient access to patents that cover the MPEG-4 technology. 262  In
addition to providing "one-stop" shopping for these licenses, the MPEG-4
Patent Pool license includes annual limitations "to provide cost predictability,
lowered thresholds to encourage early-stage adopters, and report-free
253 See id
254 See id.
255 See A History of Success-A Future in Innovation, MPEG LA,
http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/AboutHistory.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
256 See About, MPEG LA, http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/About.aspx (last visited Apr. 6,2018).
MPEG LA claims to be a "packager of patent pools" and a leader in the "many to many" licensing model.
See id
257 See Who We Are, MPEG, https://mpeg.chiariglione.org/who-we-are (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
258 See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, to Gerrard R. Benney
(June 26, 1997), https://wwwjustice.gov/atr/response-trustees-columbia-university-fujitsu-limited-
general-instrument-corp-lucent.
2 See Serafino, supra note 251, at 17-18.
26 See id
261 See MPEG-2 Introduction, MPEG LA,
http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/M2/Pages/Intro.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
262 See MPEG-4 Visual Introduction, MPEG LA,
http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/M4V/Pages/Intro.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
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licensing options to decrease the burden on implementers.2 63 These MPEG-
LA administered patent pools illustrate the value of patent pools as something
more than just a revenue source for patent contributors; licensees benefit not
only from the ability to access patents held by a large number of companies,
but also from licensing terms specifically aimed at encouraging use of the
patent pools. Consumers, of course, receive the benefit of high quality video
products on their televisions, computers, and digital devices at a reasonable
cost.
As an example in the non-ICT space, MPEG-LA is currently working to
form a patent pool covering CRISPR technology.2" CRISPR is a genome
engineering technology with widespread applications, including medical,
agricultural, environmental, and others; this technology has incredible
potential in many areas.265 The patents that cover CRISPR technology and
its uses, however, are held by an ever-increasing number of companies.266
For this reason, MPEG-LA seeks to extend the model of patent pool licensing
it applied in the digital video field (with the MPEG-2 and MPEG-4 Patent
Pools) and apply it to CRISPR.2 67 This situation of an important technology
being covered by many potentially overlapping patents, held by multiple and
diverse patent owners, is precisely the type of business and legal problem that
patent pools are designed to solve.
IV. IGNORANCE ABOUT SSOS AND How IT HARMS INNOVATION
To the extent that courts and commentators discuss standardized
technology and SSOs at all, it is usually with suspicion or allegations of harm.
Rarely, if ever, are the benefits of SSOs raised-benefits to innovative
companies that participate in SSOs, to manufacturers that implement the
standard, to society at large are simply not mentioned. The most commonly-
raised concerns about SSOs and standardized technology are based on the
patent hold-up and royalty stacking theories. 268 Related to these concerns are
fights about the meaning of FRAND, including the royalty amounts and how
much negotiation is permitted or even required under a FRAND
263 See i
26 See CRISPR, MPEG LA, http://www.mpegiacom/main/pid/CRISPR/Initiative.aspx (last visited
Apr. 6, 2018).
265 See id
26 See, e.g, The IPStudies 2017 CRISPR Patent Landscape Is Out, Don't Miss It!, IPSTUDIES,
https://www.ipstudies.ch/2017/01/the-ipstudies-2017-crispr-patent-landscape-is-out-dont-miss-it/ (last
visited Apr. 6, 2018).
267 See CRISPR, supra note 265.
2" See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 1991.
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commitment.2 69 Unfortunately, many claims of patent hold-up and royalty
stacking are simply related to disagreements over how much the licensee
would prefer to pay versus how much the patent holder is requesting. 27 0 The
fact that these disagreements are not uncommon does not mean, however,
that patent hold-up or royalty stacking is taking place. After all, businesses
frequently engage in aggressive price negotiations over all sorts of products,
and IP licensing is no different. In fact, as also noted above, there is little
actual evidence of patent hold-up and royalty stacking.271 In contrast,
evidence points against this reality-in the field of mobile telephony, there
is continuous innovation, lowering of prices, and increasing market
penetration, including new and returning market entrants. 27 2 In a disturbing
trend, even without any evidence that patent hold-up or royalty stacking
actually occurs in practice, courts and commentators are still using concerns
over these theoretical problems to justify efforts to "reform" behavior by
SSOs and SSO participants. This section explains courts' and commentators'
misguided efforts in this regard and concludes by discussing how these
proposals are based on or rooted in fundamental misunderstandings of SSOs.
A. Proposals to Fix the Imagined SSO Problems
Courts and commentators are actively attempting to solve the purported
problems caused by standardization. Courts are approaching the issue largely
by crafting creative remedies or worse, outright denying some remedies to
SEP owners. Commentators, on the other hand, are seeking to influence
change through proposals aimed at altering the behavior of either SSOs, SSO
participants, or both. This section describes these efforts.
269 See, e.g., Ove Granstrand & Marcus Holgersson, The 25% Rule Revisited and A New Investment-
Based Method for Determining FRAND Licensing Royalties, 47 LES NOUVELLES 188, 188-89 (2012).
270 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877-79 (2012) (discussing litigation
arising out of a negotiation breakdown in patent licensing).
271 See Sidak, supra note 75, at 718-19 (discussing studies by Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farra,
and Jorge Padilla, as well as by Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato). See also Geradin et al., The
Complements Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J.
Scr. & TECH. 144, 145 (2008); Kirti Gupta, Technology Standards and Competition in the Mobile Wireless
Industry, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 866 (2016) (citing statements of experts in a patent infringement
case involving SEPs, where the experts were unable to point to evidence of actual patent hold-up); Damien
Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent
Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND 25 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssm.com/abstract-946792.
272 See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 103, at 4 nn.12-14.
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1. The Courts
Courts have addressed theoretical concerns about patent hold-up and
royalty stacking in general by using their power to shape remedies in patent
infringement cases involving SEPs. Both damages calculations and
availability of injunctive relief have been in some cases modified to achieve
these courts' goals. The easiest way to illustrate how courts are approaching
the alleged problems with standardized technology is to review cases where
judges have addressed the issues in question.
a. Damages
One way courts have approached theoretical concerns about patent hold-
up and royalty stacking is to specifically inject consideration of these issues
into the damages calculation process. Although very few courts have
considered FRAND rates in SEP cases, they have all taken slightly different
approaches.2 73 In all the cases, however, the judges have altered the typical
damage award calculation to reflect what are believed to be problems with
SEPs.
In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,274 Judge Robart in the Western
District of Washington sought to determine a reasonable royalty for
Motorola's patents covering two industry standards (ITU's H.264
audiovisual compression standard and IEEE's 802.11 wireless networking
standards).27 5 In doing so, Judge Robart first looked to the reasonable royalty
damages analysis based on Georgia-Pacific, a typical way to determine
reasonable royalty rates in patent infringement cases that attempts to recreate
a hypothetical negotiation between a willing licensor and licensee.276 Judge
Robart, however, reasoned that the parties would "look[] at the importance
of the SEPs to the standard and the importance of the standard and the SEPs
to the product at issue" when negotiating a royalty.277 To account for this
issue, Judge Robart, then opined that construction of a hypothetical
negotiation in a case involving SEPs must "consider alternatives that could
have been written into the standard instead of the patented technology" with
273 See Ryan Davis, 4 Things to Know About the Latest FRAND Rate-Setting Case, LAW360 (Jan. 4,
2018, 9:36 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/998063/4-things-to-know-about-the-latest-frand-rate-
setting-case.
274 No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
275 Id. at*1_2.
276 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(enumerating factors for calculating reasonable royalties). See also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
580 F.3d 1301, 1324-36 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming and applying the Georgia-Pacific factors).
277 Microsofi Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *3.
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a focus "on the period before the standard was adopted and implemented (i.e.,
ex ante)."278 To realize this hypothetical negotiation, Judge Robart crafted
the following methodology that reflects his concerns. According to Judge
Robart, royalties should:
[1.] Be set at a level consistent with the SSOs' goal of promoting
widespread adoption of their standards ....
[2.] [R]ecognize and seek to mitigate the risk of patent hold-up ....
[3.] [A]ddress the risk of royalty stacking by considering the aggregate
royalties that would apply if other SEP holders made royalty demands of
the implementer....
[4.] [G]uarantee that holders of valuable intellectual property will receive
reasonable royalties on that property.... [and]
[5.] [I]nterpret[] [the FRAND commitment] to limit a patent holder to a
reasonable royalty on the economic value of the patented technology itself,
apart from the value associated with incorporation of the patented
technology into the standard.279
This approach has some significant problems, especially as it elevates the
importance of patent hold-up and royalty stacking, which are merely
theoretical problems, and inserts these doctrines into what is supposed to be
a hypothetical negotiation between the parties, which would unlikely ever
consider these issues when determining the value of the technology.
However, Judge Robart takes this error-filled approach to determining
royalty rates even further down the wrong pathway by considering patent
pool licensing rates in "determining a royalty rate and range." 280  As
discussed in Section H above, the activities and purposes of SSOs and patent
pools are very different; SSOs collaborate to solve technical problems, while
patent pools exist to solve business and legal problems. Assuming, as Judge
Robart did, that patent pool licensing rates are an appropriate source of
determining reasonable royalty rates for SEPs is woefully misguided.
Unfortunately, Judge Robart is not alone in his approach to calculating
FRAND rates, which specifically injects theoretical concerns about patent
hold-up and royalty stacking into the calculation of damages in SEP
infringement cases. In In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation,2 8 1
Judge Holderman of the Northern District of Illinois followed generally the
framework laid out by Judge Robart.282 Judge Holderman explicitly stated
278 See id at *13
279 See id at *12.
280 See id at *19.
2' No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3,2013).
282 See id at *9-
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that avoiding the "substantial problem" of patent hold-up and preventing
royalty stacking were two important considerations when determining a
FRAND royalty rate.283
In the most recent case to address FRAND rates in an SEP infringement
case, TCL Communication Technology Holdings Inc. v. Ericsson Inc., Judge
Selna of the Central District of California also was concerned about royalty
stacking and patent hold-up in determining his approach to royalty rate
calculation.2 8 To avoid issues related to royalty stacking and patent hold-
up, Judge Selna used the top down method to calculate the FRAND rate. 28 5
Specifically, because the starting point of the top down method begins with
the maximum aggregate royalty burden and works downwards to find a
reasonable royalty, it avoids that possibility that any licensee would be forced
to pay "an unreasonable amount in total." 286 Additionally, it prohibits SEP
owners from charging a premium, preventing patent hold-up. 28 7
While commentators applauded Selna's approach, the top down method
is not without problems. 288 First, as Judge Selna acknowledges, the approach
is not a substitute for a market approach that considers comparable
licenses.2 89 Second, there are difficulties in determining where to assess the
maximum aggregate royalty burden-at an upstream component level or at a
downstream end-consumer device, or somewhere in between. 290 Finally, the
primary question-assessing the value of the SEP in question relative to all
SEPs related to the standard in order to divide the maximum aggregate
royalty fairly-remains a challenging issue. 2 9' Even putting aside the
difficulties inherent in this approach, the bottom line is that Judge Selna
selected this method specifically to prevent the theoretical problems of
283 See id.
2" TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings Inc. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-341
JVS(DFMx), 2017 WL 6611635 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21,2017).
Judge Selna also imposed a stricter definition of "non-discriminatory" than has been typically considered
in these cases; however, although this is a key issue for the case, it is not as directly tied to the points of
royalty stacking and patent hold-up that are at issue in this Section. Id at *49-50.
2' See id. at *8-9.
26 See id
m See id
See Davis, supra note 274 (quoting Professor Thomas Cotter as saying the approach "has a lot
going for it in trying to figure out a rational way to apportion the value of patents" and Professor Jorge
Contreras, "Top-down is the only way to do it that makes any sense, in my opinion").
' See TCL Communication, 2017 WL 6611635, at *8-9.
2 See Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Determining RAND Royalty Rates for Standard-
Essential Patents, ANTITRUST, Fall 2014, at 86, 89-90.
291 Seeid
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royalty stacking and patent hold-up, regardless of whether this method would
arrive at a fair and true royalty rate for the SEP owner. 29 2
Ericsson has already appealed this most recent case to the Federal
Circuit, and so we are likely to receive guidance on FRAND calculations in
the near future, although it is unlikely to provide a clear methodology.2 93 In
fact, the Federal Circuit has weighed in on FRAND royalty calculations in
earlier cases and the result was anything but clear. In Ericsson v. D-Link, the
Federal Circuit reversed and remanded in a case where the district court's
jury instruction involved applying the Georgia-Pacific factors without
modification. 2 94 In this case, the Federal Circuit stated that a jury "must be
told to consider the difference between the added value of the technological
invention and the added value of that invention's standardization." 295
FRAND royalties "must be premised on the value of the patented feature, not
any value added by the standard's adoption of the patented technology."29 6
To reach this end, the Federal Circuit determined that "widespread adoption
due to standardization" was not an inherent benefit of SEPs,2 97 when quite
the opposite is true. The bottom line after this case is that it is essential to
disaggregate the value of standardization (that comes from reduction in
transaction costs for implementers and network effects generated by
interoperability) from the value of the technologies incorporated in the
standard.298
The Federal Circuit has reiterated this concept again in Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation v Cisco Systems, where it
stated that SSO participants are not entitled to share in the "benefit created
by standardization-benefit that would otherwise flow to consumers and
businesses practicing the standard."29 9 Instead, the Federal Circuit remanded
the trial court's damages award to consider an adjustment in view of the
standard's role in the product's commercial success-i.e., decreasing the
reasonable royalty.300
Based on these cases, it seems that damages calculations via FRAND
determination must attempt to mitigate the risk of patent hold-up and address
the risk of royalty stacking "that would apply if other SEP holders made
292 See TCL Communication, 2017 WL 6611635, at *14.
293 See id., appeal docketed, 2018-1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
294 773 F.3d 1201, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
295 Id at 1233.
296 See id at 1232.
297 Id. at 1233.
2" See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Value of the Standard Versus the Value of Standardization, 68
BAYLOR L. REV. 59, 60 (2016).
29 809 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
31 Id. at 1305-06.
2018] 203
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW
royalty demands of the implementer."'oi Both Judge Robart and Judge
Holderman addressed the risk of royalty stacking by considering the
aggregate royalties that would apply if other SEP holders made similar
royalty demands on the implementer, without requiring the implementers to
show what royalties they were currently paying.302 Robart rejected
Motorola's argument that potential royalty stacking concerns had not, to date,
impeded the widespread adoption of the relevant standards, stating that the
"argument is misplaced."30 3 The court reasoned that "[w]hether other SEP
holders have complied with their RAND obligations says nothing as to
whether Motorola has met its own. Thus, the court must determine a
reasonable royalty rate for Motorola's SEPs based on the principles
underlying the RAND commitment, one of which is the concern for royalty
stacking."304 Judge Selna similarly began from a position of trying to avoid
royalty stacking and patent hold-up, without any evidence that these were
issues in the TCL Communications case or even issues at all.30 s
The one bright spot in this discussion of judges, charging at royalty
stacking and patent hold-up like Don Quixote charged at windmills, is Judge
Davis, who presided over the district court trial in Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link.3 o
Judge Davis refused to reduce the FRAND royalty rate determined by the
jury based on theoretical concerns about hold-up and royalty stacking,
finding the defendants "failed to present any evidence of actual hold-up or
royalty stacking" and noticed that defendant's experts "never even attempted
to determine the actual amount of royalties Defendants currently pay for ...
[the relevant] patents."30 7 Additionally, Ericsson presented evidence that it
considered royalty stacking issues when it established its rates and therefore
Ericsson's FRAND rate did not fail to account for hold-up or royalty
stacking.3 08
301 Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, supra note 81.
302 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *11-12 (W.D.
Wash Apr. 25, 2013); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, L.L.C., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *9-10
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
31 Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *74.
304 Id
30S See TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings, L.T.D. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-
341 JVS(DFMx), 2017 WL 6611635, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017).
3 Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013 WL 4046225 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013),
rev 'd on other grounds, 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Ericsson, Inc., 773 F.3d at 1233-35 ("In
this case, we agree with the district court that D-Link failed to provide evidence of patent hold-up and
royalty stacking .... A jury, moreover, need not be instructed regarding royalty stacking unless there is
actual evidence of stacking.").
307 See Ericsson Inc., 2013 WL 4046225, at *18, *26.
3 See id
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b. Injunctive Relief
District courts and the International Trade Commission (ITC) have also
used the availability of injunctive relief for infringement of SEPs, or more
accurately, the denial of injunctive relief, as another means to alter SSO
participant behavior.3 09 This is particularly acute at the ITC because the
primary remedy available is a restriction on importation-effectively an
injunction.31o Denial of injunctive relief, as a tool to prevent generally
theoretical problems, is even more troubling than the changes in damage
calculations detailed above.
In Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered
Motorola's request for an injunction, seeking to prevent Apple's sales of
allegedly infringing RAND-encumbered patents essential to certain wireless
telecommunications standards.311 Motorola contended that Apple negotiated
in bad faith by refusing Motorola's allegedly FRAND-compliant terms and
stalling negotiations.312 The trial court with the Seventh Circuit's Judge
Posner sitting by designation, denied Motorola's request, reasoning that in
making a RAND commitment, the patent holder has already acknowledged
that money, in the form of royalties, would be adequate compensation,
eliminating the factor of irreparable harm under eBay.313 The Federal Circuit
upheld Judge Posner's decision, but offered different reasoning for denying
the injunction. First, "to the extent that the district court applied aper se rule
that injunctions are unavailable for SEPs it erred."3 14 Although it may be
difficult to establish irreparable harm, Judge Reyna noted that "an injunction
may be justified where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or
unreasonably delays negotiations to the same effect."" The Federal Circuit,
however, upheld the denial of injunction because "negotiations have been
" See Doris Johnson Hines & J. Preston Long, Un-FRAND-ly Behavior, 87 BNA PAT. TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT J. 572(2014).
310 Seeid
"' 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled by Williamson v. Citrix Online, L.L.C., 792 F.3d 1339
(2015).
312 See Apple, Inc., 757 F.3d at 1332.
313 See id Factors considered in issuing a permanent injunction include: "(1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction." eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
314 Apple, Inc., 757 F.3d at 1331. This is not dissimilar to statement in eBa--per se grant or denial of
injunction based on any one fact is improper. Id at 1332. Judge Prost took the opposite viewpoint, that
an implementer's negotiation conduct (or lack thereof) should still never justify the grant of an injunction.
Id. at 1342-43 (Prost, J., dissenting in part).
" See id at 1332.
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ongoing, and there is no evidence that Apple has been, for example,
unilaterally refusing to agree to a deal." 316 Judge Rader concurred that a
unilateral refusal to take a FRAND license could trigger injunction but
dissented from the denial of Motorola's injunction request because there was
evidence that Apple was a patent holdout.317 He also pointed to evidence that
Apple failed to even discuss a license for years while infringing Motorola's
patent."'
The Ninth Circuit also weighed in on injunctive relief when it reviewed
the Microsoft v. Motorola case, discussed above. 3 19  Microsoft sued
Motorola, asserting Motorola's initial offer was a breach of its FRAND
commitments, and Motorola responded by filing a countersuit seeking an
injunction, as well as filing for an injunction with the ITC.32 0 The Ninth
Circuit accepted the jury's finding that Motorola had breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing by pursuing these injunctions.32 1 Specifically, the
court found that Motorola lacked a legitimate fear of irreparable harm and
embraced the theory that "a FRAND-encumbered patentee may violate its
duty of good faith and fair dealing and breach its FRAND commitment by
seeking injunctive relief."322
The facts of this case and the court's reasoning for denying an injunction
demonstrate just how far the deck has been stacked against SEP owners.
Motorola, an innovative company, contributed technology to an SSO which
was then selected by the SSO to be included in the technology standard. 323
Microsoft was using the standardized technology in its product and thus was
likely infringing Motorola's patents. Motorola did what patentees often do
in these situations-it sent a letter to Microsoft offering to license these
patents.3 24 Rather than contacting Motorola to accept Motorola's offer or
viewing the offer as an invitation to negotiate license terms, Microsoft filed
a lawsuit, taking umbrage with Motorola's opening offer as a breach of its
FRAND commitment.325 This alone seems bizarre; how could Motorola's
offer to license (which in many cases is simply an invitation to negotiate) be
a breach? But from there, the case only got stranger. Motorola responded to
the filing of the lawsuit by Microsoft by countersuing, alleging patent
316 Id.
317 Id at 1332-34 (Rader, J., dissenting in part).
318 See id
319 See supra notes 275-84, 303-05 and accompanying text.
320 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2015).
321 Id. at 1047.
322 See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 103, at 32-33 (citing Microsoft Corp., 795 F.3d at 1048-49).
323 See Microsoft Corp., 795 F.3d at 1032.
324 See id
325 See id
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infringement and seeking an injunction,326 as patent owners often do when
sued. Judge Robart used this action, completely ordinary and common
behavior of patent owners, as evidence that Motorola breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing.3 27 Even though Microsoft chose to sue, rather
than attempt to negotiate, the court punished Motorola for the simple act of
trying to enforce its patent rights.
The result of the deck being stacked against the SEP owner, as illustrated
by how Judge Robart treated Motorola, is that implementers are perversely
incentivized to infringe at will and wait for the SEP owner to litigate. If, at
best, the SEP owner will get damages in the amount of a FRAND royalty rate
(and as was discussed above, these royalty rates have been greatly decreased
by the courts due to the presence of the standard), there is no incentive for an
implementer to negotiate or accept a license from the SEP owner. With the
threat of injunction removed, there is no difference to the implementer
between accepting a licensing offer or simply waiting to be sued. An
illustration of how the courts' denials of injunction change incentives to
negotiate is found in Core Wireless v. LG Electronics.28 Core Wireless, a
joint endeavor of Microsoft and Nokia to hold multiple patents, assigned its
portfolio to Conversant Intellectual Property Management.3 2 9 Conversant
initiated negotiations with LG Electronics; LG ultimately responded with a
"terse one-page presentation stating that a lawsuit was . . . 'preferable' to a
license, and that LG would prefer to wait until another major cell phone
manufacturer licensed the portfolio . . . . LG, thus, pursued a path of
patent hold-out, 331 forcing Core Wireless to expend considerable resources in.
legal and attorney fees to obtain the license fees it originally sought. Without
a credible injunctive threat, implementers simply have no incentive to
negotiate in good faith.
2. The Commentators
Courts are not the only entities seeking to solve the imagined problems
with standardization. Commentators have also developed several proposals
aimed at mitigating or eliminating the theoretical concerns of patent hold-up
326 See id.
31m See id at 1046-47.
328 See Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2:14-cv-912-JRG, 2016 WL
10749825 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2016).
329 Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 103, at 35-36. Conversant is a patent licensing firm that assumed
responsibility for licensing Core Wireless's portfolio and other obligations in exchange for revenue
sharing. See id
3 See Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L., 2016 WL 10749825, at *1.
"' See id
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and royalty stacking. Some of these proposals mirror the efforts of the courts,
but others have not yet been seen in the litigation setting. All of these
proposals, however, have the ultimate effect of stacking the deck against SEP
owners and SSO participants in favor of implementers, which decrease the
appeal for any innovative company to participate in SSOs. As noted earlier,
technology standards are most robust and standard adoption is more effective
when participation in SSOs is attractive to innovative firms.
One commonly raised proposal is for SSOs to insist that SSO participants
agree to ex ante licensing of any patent that may eventually be designated as
an SEP. Many SSOs have FRAND licensing policies that do not describe the
specific terms of the obligations, allowing instead for the members to fill in
the missing details and hopefully avoid running afoul of courts and
competition enforcement agencies.332 Ex ante licensing rules would require
patent owners to disclose the maximum royalty rate they would charge, thus
eliminating a patent holder's ability to engage in ex post negotiations in a
supra-competitive environment.33 3 This provision clearly weighs in favor of
the implementer by tying the hands of the SSO participant.
Another typical suggestion by commentators is to focus the FRAND
inquiry specifically towards the mitigation of opportunistic behavior by SEP
owners; that is, these proposals view FRAND from an implementer-centric
perspective and use an SEP owner's FRAND commitment as a way to tightly
constrain that SSO participant.3 34 FRAND royalties must provide the patent
owner with reasonable compensation, while at the same time limiting the
patent holder to a reasonable royalty on the economic value of the patented
technology itself, apart from the value associated with the patent's
incorporation into the standard, using comparable licenses where possible. 3 3 5
The FRAND issue that has been most controversial of late is the methodology
of determining a "reasonable royalty." 336 An interpretation of reasonable
royalty is that value that emerges from ex post bilateral bargaining between
a willing licensor and a willing licensee.337 The prevailing damage analysis
is set out in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.,
although it is not directly applicable to the FRAND question; in fact, some
332 See Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and Other
Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451, 1453 (2015).
. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 19, at 33.
1 See Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 333, at 1454. But see Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 103 for
another perspective.
.. See Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Damages, supra note 78.
33 See Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 333, at 1458.
31 See id. at 1467.
338 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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factors are contrary to FRAND principles.33 9 For this reason, as noted above,
courts have recently modified the Georgia-Pacific factors to accommodate
the unique issues of FRAND.340 Commentators too have suggested these and
other modifications to the Georgia-Pacific factors should be implemented to
alleviate patent hold-up and royalty stacking.341
Other primary disputed and open issues with respect to FRAND include:
whether methodologies for determining FRAND royalty rates or damages
must take into account concerns about patent hold-up and royalty stacking or
whether implementers must provide actual proof of hold-up or royalty
stacking; whether courts should apply the incremental value rule in
determining FRAND rates and damages; what constitutes a comparable
license for benchmarking purposes; and whether the appropriate royalty base
is limited to the "smallest salable patent practicing unit" and what that
actually means (i.e., whether a patent is fully implemented by the end user
device, such as the handset, or component part, such as the chipset).3 42 This
is problematic, however, because it represents a departure from real-world
licensing practices; actual licenses specify reasonable royalty rates as a
percentage of a downstream product.3 43  To base licenses instead on the
smallest salable patent practicing unit means that rates will be determined
without consideration of market data from comparable licenses, because this
type of royalty base is not used by the market.
Commentators argue that the patent owner should be entitled to no more
than the "incremental value" of the patented technology, relative to its next-
best alternative and measured before the standard has been adopted.3"
Indeed, the 2011 FTC report entitled "The Evolving IP Marketplace:
Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition," states that sound
practice requires "when it can be determined, [for] the incremental value of
the patented invention over the next-best alternative [to] establish[ ] the
maximum amount that a willing licensee would pay in a hypothetical
339 See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("In a case involving
RAND-encumbered patents, many of the Georgia-Pacific factors simply are not relevant; many are even
contrary to RAND principles.").
" See, e.g., id at 1231-32.
341 See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable
Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661 (2010); Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, The
Value of the Standard, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1164 (2017).
342 See Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, Methodologiesfor Calculating FRAND Damages, supra note 80.
343 See Sidak, supra note 299, at 59-60.
* See Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 333, at 12-13.
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negotiation" 345 as a maximum limit on reasonable royalties. But determining
the next best alternative or how the rate should be set is far from clear.34
Many commentators also insist that courts should limit the circumstances
in which a patentee may receive injunctive relief.3 47  A per se ban on
injunctions, however, would discourage participation in SSOs.3 48 As noted
above, in March 2015, IEEE adopted a set of IPR policy revisions that stated
a FRAND commitment to the IEEE "precludes seeking, or seeking to
enforce" an injunction unless 1) "the implementer fails to participate in, or to
comply with the outcome of, an adjudication including an affirming first-
level appellate review" or 2) in "jurisdictions where the failure to request a
Prohibitive Order in a pleading waives the right to seek a Prohibitive Order
at a later time."3 49 This is even more restrictive than the courts' denial of
injunctions; at least the Ninth Circuit and Federal Circuit left open the
possibility of an injunction if the implementer categorically refused to
negotiate.350 IEEE also included a hint of the Ericsson opinion, requiring that
"reasonable rates" under FRAND must exclude the value resulting from
inclusion in the standard.3 1 ' And just as discussed above, per se denial of
injunctive relief in SEP infringement cases definitely favors the implementer
at the expense of the SSO participant.
Last, but certainly not least, Renata Hesse, previously former Acting
Assistant Attorney General, overseeing the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, offered what she deemed procompetitive policy
choices for SSOs.352 These included:
Establish procedures to identify, in advance, technology that involves
patents which the patent holder has not agreed to license on F/RAND terms
and determine whether that technology should be included in the standard;
34 FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 189 (2011).
* See Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff & Daniel Spulber, The F7, IP, and SSOs: Government
Hold-Up Replacement Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1 (2012),
https://doi.org/10.1093/joclenhs002 (offering a robust criticism of the 2011 FTC report, and instead
advocating for the maintenance of the status quo).
347 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 2035-39 (suggesting injunctive relief be limited to
instances where the patent protects a significant portion of the final product value).
o See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Taylor M. Owings & Joshua D. Wright, Enjoining Injunctions: The
Case Against Antitrust Liability for Standard Essential Patents, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct 2014, at 1, 1-
2.
349 IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, IEEE STANDARDS Ass'N § 6.2 (Dec. 2015),
http://standards.icee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sbbylaws.pdf.
" See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2015); Apple, Inc. v.
Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
1' See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 350, § 6.1.
352 See Hesse, supra note 36.
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Make it clear that licensing commitments made to the standards body are
intended to bind both the current patent holder and subsequent purchasers
of the patents and that commitments extend to all implementers of the
standard, whether or not they are a member of the standards body;
Give licensees the option to license F/RAND-encumbered patents essential
to a standard on a cash-only basis and prohibit mandatory cross-licensing
of patents that are not essential . . . while permitting voluntary cross-
licensing of all patents;
Place some limitations on the right of the patent holder who has made a
F/RAND licensing commitment who seeks to exclude a willing and able
licensee from market through an injunction....
Make improvements to lower the transaction costs of determining F/RAND
licensing terms.... [and]
Consider ways to increase certainty that patent holders believe that
disclosed patents are essential to standard after it is set."'
As is clear from these proposals, Ms. Hesse suggests something akin to ex
ante licensing and denial of injunctive relief in addition to other proposals
constraining the behavior of SSOs and SSO participants. Not only do all of
Ms. Hesse's suggestions clearly demonstrate a pro-implementer perspective
(or perhaps an anti-SSO participant perspective), but as noted earlier, are
based, at best, on concern about theoretical problems. In any case, it is
difficult to view Ms. Hesse's comments as pro-competitive. 354
There are some bright spots, however, in what had recently been a very
pro-implementer/anti-SSO participant perspective in the United States
Government. In January 2017, Maureen Ohlhausen was named Acting FTC
Chairman.3 55 Ms. Ohlhausen has been critical of the FTC's "well
intentioned" efforts to advance the interests of likely infringers and has been
unwilling to wholeheartedly adopt the theoretical concerns about royalty
stacking and patent hold-up.356 Instead, although she accepts that these
problems are possible, the reality is that there is a "larger and more
complicated picture to consider."3 " Thus, she has criticized, among other
.3 See id. at 9-10.
" For example, Gregory Sidak has written a very compelling dismantling of Ms. Hesse's policy
preferences and approval of the IEEE amended IPR policies, noting how instead of being procompetitive,
they actually go against antitrust law and policy. Sidak, supra note 16
. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, FED. TRADE CoMMIssIoN, https://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/biographies/maureen-k-ohlhausen (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
3 See, e.g., David Teece, How the FTC Has Erred on Innovation Policy Issues, LAW360, (Sept. 13,
2017), https://www.Iaw360.com/articles/963535/how-the-fic-has-erred-on-innovation-policy-issues.
35 See id
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things, the no injunction rule... as well as the zealous FTC enforcement
actions against SSO participants and SEP owners.3 59
A second bright spot is Makan Delrahim, confirmed as Assistant
Attorney General for the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice in
September 2017.360 Mr. Delrahim announced in November 2017 that the
DOJ would be realigning its policy and enforcement priorities with respect
to SSOs and SEPs.36 1 Mr. Delrahim noted that "enforcers have strayed too
far in accommodating the concerns of technology implementers" at the risk
of "undermining incentives for IP creators, who are entitled to an appropriate
reward for developing break-through technologies."3 62 Additionally, he
recognizes that hold-out, where implementers threaten to not take a license,
is a more serious risk than hold-up. 6 He specifically calls out some of the
court decisions, described above, as erroneous and notes that the Antitrust
Division will "be skeptical of rules that SSOs impose that appear designed to
specifically shift bargaining leverage from lIP creators to implementers, or
vice versa." "
Ms. Ohlhausen and Mr. Delrahim provide some hope that policies will
shift back to a more even place between SSO participants and implementers,
which would benefit innovation and consumers. However, it is important to
at least understand why so many courts and commentators have gone in the
other direction, stacking the deck in favor of implementers. The next section
will explain that basic misunderstandings about how SSOs work and the
benefits that SSOs provide have led to so many bad decisions.
B. How These "Fixes" fIlustrate Significant Misunderstanding of SSOs and
Standards
Putting aside for a moment the actual existence and extent of patent hold-
up and royalty stacking in fields with standardized technology, the solutions
implemented and proposed by courts and commentators reflect a very basic
lack of understanding about how standard setting occurs. It seems that courts
- See id
. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
' Meet the Assistant Attorney General, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://wwwjustice.gov/atr/staff-
profile/meet-assistant-attorney-general (last visited Apr. 7, 2018).
"' See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, Address at the USC Gould
School of Law's Center for Transnational Law and Business Conference (November 10, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attomey-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-
gould-school-laws-center.
362 See id
361 See id.
' See id
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and commentators believe that SSOs are comprised of a bunch of lawyers,
sitting around in a dark-paneled room, hashing out the next great standard
based on intellectual property rights and horse trading. Patent valuation and
the power of the companies involved seems to be at the forefront of their
minds. In this image, the lawyers swap technologies in and out of the
standard like sophisticated children trade Monopoly properties near the end
of a game. The bartering has less to do with optimizing the technology at
hand and more to do with ensuring that each of the key players ends up with
an acceptable cut of license fees at the end of the day. Regardless of how
colorful this imagined version is, it has very little to do with reality.
Instead, this imagined view of how SSOs work is more like patent pools,
where the participants' intellectual property actually comprises the cards on
the table. This is because, as discussed above, patent pools are formed very
late in the standardization process when parties know which technology has
been incorporated.3 65 On the other hand, during the many years that go into
standard setting activity, SSO participants do not know if they will end up
being a patent owner or a licensee of the chosen technological standard, or
both.6 Additionally, SSOs and patent pools are set up to solve very different
problems, have different modes of operating, and function very differently.
Patent pools also, by themselves, alleviate much of the concern about patent
hold-up and royalty stacking3 67 and should be viewed as a partial solution to
those theoretical problems, rather than being conflated with SSOs.
Even giving courts and commentators the greatest benefit of the doubt,
their solutions for the alleged problems of patent hold-up and royalty stacking
are based, at the very best, on an erroneous view of what SSOs are doing.
These organizations are not picking from a pre-made list of essentially
equivalent alternatives; there is not a menu of equally good technologies,
from which the SSO is simply making a selection. Rather, SSOs today are at
the forefront of innovation. The technology that arises from an SSO did not
exist before. The SSO develops these technological advancements by
bringing together innovators and creating a collaborative environment by
which these gathered great minds can achieve something beyond which any
individual company could do for itself.
Yet, this collaborative community of innovators does not come without
a cost. Each of the innovative companies that agrees to be an SSO participant
does so with the understanding of the investments they have made in
research, development, and participation, as well as the risks that their
" See Baron & Pohlman, supra note 213.
31 See Sternberg, supra note 109, at 223-24.
367 See Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, Analysis of Ericcsson, supra note 85, at 6-7.
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innovations may not be selected for incorporation in the standard. They bear
these investments and risk with the further understanding that they will
receive adequate and fair remuneration as part of the FRAND commitment
they have made to the SSO. Unfortunately, the actions of the courts and the
proposals by commentators are greatly undermining the value and benefits
of SSO participation that are expected in at least two respects. First, while
attempting to fix the unproven, theoretical patent hold-up by SSO
participants, the changes are actually encouraging and facilitating patent
hold-out by implementers. Second, it is likely transaction costs for SSO
participants are increasing while a similar increase is not being imposed upon
implementers and consumers. The potential consequence of these two issues
is that contribution of technology SSOs will decrease.
FRAND commitments reflect benefits and obligations for both the SSO
participant and the implementer. The SSO participant discloses their
innovative technology and agrees to license this technology in exchange for
being incorporated into the standard and receiving a fair and reasonable
royalty when licensing its standard-essential technology. FRAND also
imposes on the implementer the duty to negotiate with SSO participants in
good faith in exchange for a license to use the technology.3 68
A FRAND commitment manifests a waiver of the ability to categorically
refuse to grant a license as well as the right to seek an injunction against an
implementer without first attempting to negotiate in good faith; however,
there is nothing about the FRAND commitment that requires (as some courts
have construed) the SSO participant waive injunctive relief when the
implementer refuses to negotiate in good faith.3 69 Absent injunctive relief in
all cases, an implementer would have the incentive to never negotiate-
leading to patent holdout.370 It is, of course, the threat of injunction that
"brings parties to the negotiating table and motivates them to draw upon the
full scope of their knowledge and creativity in forming contractual and
institutional solutions to the perceived holdup problem."3 7 '
The above cases suggest that SSO participants should be required to
continue to negotiate even after they have offered a license on FRAND-
terms, necessarily eroding their bargaining power. The cases also suggest
3" See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 103, at 5.
369 See id. at 20.
37 See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, Business Models and the Standard Setting Process, in THE PROS AND
CONS OF STANDARD SETTING 34, 49 (2010) ("[O]nce upstream patent holders have no option of seeking
injunctive relief, they will have no bargaining power at all in licensing negotiations. Especially within
standard setting contexts, where parties typically commit to license via a FRAND promise, such a rule
would amount to compulsory licensing, leaving up-stream patent holders at the mercy of licensees.").
"' See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 103, at 23-24.
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that an injunction may not be available unless an implementer refuses to
engage in any licensing discussions at all.37 2 After the injunction cases (and
IEEE's IPR policy revision), implementers have numerous motivations and
no disincentives to respond to an opening licensing offer with a lowball
counter-offer; if years down the road, after infringement litigation is initiated
and resolved, the SSO's opening offer is later found to be FRAND-
compliant, the implementer can simply accept at that time, at no additional
peril.373 Additionally, an SSO participant must necessarily offer a FRAND-
ready opening (lest they be immediately sued for breach of contract) taking
away their ability to bargain, and an implementer will obviously bargain
down from the FRAND-ready opening, pressuring SSO participants to take
an even lower license. This creates a lose-lose cycle for the SSO participant
and creates numerous motivations for implementers to infringe and to litigate
rather than negotiate.
Another problem with all of this is that most SSO participants signed
their FRAND commitments in the past, without understanding that FRAND
would be interpreted to effectively preclude a patent owner from seeking
injunction. Nothing about the FRAND commitment contracts discussed
above included a waiver of injunctive rights.37 4 In fact, since the IEEE
revised its IPR policy to include a waiver of injunctive relief, key innovators,
including Qualcomm, Nokia, Ericsson, and Interdigital are refusing to make
further FRAND commitments with IEEE.375 However, the FRAND
agreements in the cases above, where injunctive relief was denied, do not
include any such waiver.376 Rather than a broad waiver of injunctive relief,
a fairer test may be the following: injunctive relief may be appropriate for
infringement of FRAND-encumbered patents where the licensee has either
refused to pay what has been determined a FRAND royalty rate, refused to
negotiate in good faith, constructively refused to negotiate by insisting on
unfair terms during negotiation, or is not subject to jurisdiction for the award
of damages.377 Additional circumstances could also support award of an
injunction, including if the implementer engaged in opportunistic or collusive
actions to pay an unfair rate or other bad behavior.378 It is more logical for
372 See id. at 31.
.. See id. at 34-35.
31 See id at 38-39.
.' See id at 38.
376 See id; see, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2015).
." See Pamela Jones, Blackberry Tells the Federal Circuit Judge Posner Got It Wrong Re No
Injunctions for FRAND Patents in Apple v. Motorola, GROKLAW (May 10, 2013, 2:47AM),
http://www.groklaw.net/ariclebasic.php?story-20130510002810301.
" See id.
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courts to push parties toward negotiated and coordinated solutions through
strong recognition of property rights backed by principal preference for
injunctive relief.37 9 To achieve this, implementers must be required to also
negotiate in good faith for FRAND and allow injunctions when that is not the
case.3"o These tweaks to the assessment of requests for injunctive relief
would go a long way towards more fairly balancing the interests of both
implementers and SSO participants.
Additionally, the determination of whether an offered royalty rate is
FRAND should also be balanced as between the implementer and the SSO
participant, with particular concern for ensuring that the SSO participant is
receiving fair market value and an adequate return for the investment and risk
it bears. One helpful way to think about whether a given royalty rate is
FRAND-compliant includes the following factors: 1) will this rate encourage
the SSO participant's continued participation in standard setting activities; 2)
does the implementer have reasonable access to the standard; 3) is the rate
consistent with a reasonable aggregate royalty amount for the implementer's
product; and 4) does the rate approximate those of similarly situated
licenses.38 1 Furthermore, both the SSO participant and the implementer must
have the ability to negotiate. An initial offer by the SSO participant should
be viewed simply as a starting point and not a FRAND violation simply
because the implementer would like to pay less, just as an implementer does
not violate its obligation to negotiate by refusing the initial offer, so long as
it has indicated a willingness to negotiate further in good faith.382 Again,
these simple changes, rather than wide-sweeping modifications, should
address the theoretical concerns about patent hold-up and royalty stacking,
while preserving the ability of the SSO participant to receive adequate value
for their participation.
Providing sufficient incentives for innovative firms to continue to
participate in SSOs is critical for many reasons. First, standards are more
valuable based on widespread acceptance and adoption." This enhances the
network effects described above and provides benefits for SSO participants,
implementers, and consumers alike. Second, standards are likely to be more
innovative and technologically robust with more participation. Any standard
is only as good as the technological contributions it has to select from, and
these technological contributions are made even better through the iterative
" See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 103, at 27.
3o See id. at 37.
38 See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:1O-CV-473, 2013 WL 4046225, at *25 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 6, 2013).
382 See id.
38 See Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 333, at 32.
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review and revision process that SSOs provide. Decreased SSO participation
may mean fewer technological contributions, and may also result in a weaker
community of scientists and engineers reviewing and making suggestions for
improvement. Third, because of FRAND commitments, participation in an
SSO by an innovative firm means that technology covered by SEPs will be
made widely available for license to implementers. 38 Finally, participation
in SSOs creates a competition amongst firms in the particular technology
space, increasing the pace of innovation.385 The collaboration that follows
this competition further hastens the rate of innovation. All of these positive
aspects of standardization require extensive and active participation by
numerous innovative firms.
To continue to attract the most active and innovative firms to the standard
setting process, policies surrounding SSO participants must acknowledge and
protect these firms' intellectual property rights. "[T]he incentive to develop
new products and processes on which to base future standardization will be
lost if the standard-making process is carried out without due regard for
intellectual property rights."8 6 These innovative firms may instead opt to
decline to participate in standard setting activities to avoid the burdens and
detrimental aspects associated with SSOs and SEPs. In fact, the absence of
intellectual property rights may lead to the underproduction of standards. 387
Worse still, as these innovative firms stop participating in SSOs, they may
also be less inclined to license their technology to the industry or may even
decrease resources allocated to research and development altogether.3 88
Some may contend that this is merely a parade of horribles and that the
changes being implemented by the courts and proposed by commentators are
not going to have actual detrimental effects. Although there are few data
points, it is not mere argument that SSO participants will decrease
participation if the costs of standard setting activity become greater than the
benefits afforded. For example, ETSI's initial efforts at crafting an IPR
policy included substantial restrictions on SSO participants, including setting
maximum royalty rates and a waiver of injunctive relief.3 89 Many SSO
participants and other SSOs were highly critical of these provisions and even
3 See Stoll, supra note 23.
385 See Robert P. Taylor, Standard Setting: A Growing Morass, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ANTITRUST 2002 545, 547 (David Bender ed., 2002) ("Collaborative standard setting is pervasive in the
modem economy and increasingly important to healthy competition in numerous industries.").
38 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission: Intellectual
Property Rights and Standardization, at 1, COM (1992) 445 final (Oct. 27, 1992).
38. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 19, at 4.
3 See id at 29.
389 See Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND
Commitment, 9 INT'L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 17 (2011).
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threatened to withdraw from ETSI, leading ETSI to abandon these more
restrictive provisions in favor of a more traditional FRAND policy.3 " As
policies affecting SSO participants become more unfavorable to innovative
firms contributing their technology to standards, it would be foolish to
assume that they will simply accept the new terms and continue contributing
technology to SSOs.
V. CONCLUSION
Returning to the lawsuit mentioned in the Introduction to this article, the
FTC has brought suit against Qualcomm, alleging that the company's SEP
licensing practices hinder innovation.3 9 1 However, the reality is that the
opposite is true. What will actually impede innovation is courts and
commentators, and now the FTC, interfering with SSOs and SSO
participants, making participation in standard setting activities less attractive.
One reason for this is that the changes in policy being implemented and
proposed are coming from entities that do not understand the complexities of
the standard setting process. Specifically, there are significant investments
being made and risks being assumed by SSO participants in exchange for a
limited set of benefits. Recent legal and policy changes to SEP licensing are
eviscerating these benefits with no regard for the investments and risks
undertaken. As participation in SSOs becomes less appealing, innovative
firms are likely to opt out of participation in standard setting and, possibly,
out of innovation altogether. In essence, the ignorance about standard setting
will win over innovation.
3 See id. at 17, 21. Additionally, ETSI has twice since tried to define its IPR policies and FRAND
provisions in ways that were more restrictive to SSO participants and both times subsequently backed
down from the change due to SSO participant pressure. See id at 18-21.
391 See Lipman, FTC Sues Qualcomm, supra note 3.
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